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PROFESSIONAL RIGHTS SPEECH
Timothy Zick*
ABSTRACT
Some regulations of professional-client communications raise important,
but sofar largely overlooked, constitutional concerns. Three recent examples
of professional speech regulation-restrictions on physician inquiries
regarding firearms, "reparative" therapy bans, and compelled abortion
disclosures-highlight an important intersection between professional
speech and constitutional rights. In each of the three examples, state
regulations implicate a non-expressive constitutional right--the right to bear
arms, equality, and abortion. States are actively, sometimes even
aggressively, using their licensing authority to limit and structure
conversations between professionals and their clients regarding
constitutional rights. The author contends that government regulation of
"professional rights speech" should be subjected to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. Many professionals perform critical, but under-
appreciated, functions with regard to the recognition and effective exercise
of constitutional rights. Moreover, the author contends that the mere fact that
the speakers are professionals and the listeners are clients or patients does
not extinguish or diminish First Amendment protections or concerns. To the
contrary, the examples discussed in the Article demonstrate various reasons,
rooted in free speech values, constitutional rights, and professionalism norms
for subjecting at least some professional speech regulations to heightened
First Amendment scrutiny.
* Mills E. Godwin, Jr. Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent Article, I argued that governmental regulation of "rights
speech"-communications about or concerning the recognition, scope, or
exercise of constitutional rights-raises distinctive constitutional concerns
and merits heightened judicial scrutiny.' This Article elaborates on the
intersection between freedom of speech and other constitutional rights, with
a specific focus on professional-client relationships. It considers whether the
fact that the speakers and audiences in this context are professionals and their
individual clients minimizes or eliminates concerns regarding regulation of
rights speech. To the contrary, the Article concludes that regulations of
"professional rights speech" raise significant constitutional concerns and thus
also merit heightened-sometimes strict-judicial scrutiny.
1. See Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2014).
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The extent to which government can regulate communications between
licensed professionals and their clients has received limited, but renewed,
attention from courts and scholars. The Supreme Court has said relatively
little about the First Amendment's coverage of professional advice and
communications.2 This is likely to change. States are becoming increasingly
active, even aggressive, in the area of professional speech regulation. Lower
courts are struggling to make sense of the cryptic guidance the Court has
provided in this area. Scholars, particularly in recent years, have spent
comparatively more time examining regulation of professional speech.3 Yet
they too have struggled to clarify the professional speech doctrine.
In general, governments can impose basic licensure and registration
requirements for professions.4 Thus, for example, even though it may prohibit
expression, a state requirement that lawyers be licensed to practice law does
not conflict with the Free Speech Clause.' Further, the First Amendment does
not protect professionals who fail to meet applicable standards of professional
2. See discussion infra Section I.A.
3. For scholarly commentary on professional speech, see ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY,
EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE
(2012) [hereinafter POST, JURISPRUDENCE]; Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech,
Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771
(1999); Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. _ (forthcoming) (draft on file with
the author); Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth ": Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000). For works that examine speech restrictions
relating to specific professionals, such as lawyers or physicians see Paula Berg, Toward a First
Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical
Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1994); Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 1277 (2014); Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's
Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787 (1996); Jennifer M. Keighley,
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment's Limit on Compelled
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347 (2013); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939,
959-62 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Informed Consent]; Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:
Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 399-400
(2008); Kathleen Sullivan, Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on
Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569 (1998).
4. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding
fortune-telling licensure regulations under the "professional speech doctrine"); Locke v. Shore,
634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11 th Cir. 2011) (upholding interior-design licensing law under rational basis
standard); Accountant's Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 604-05 (4th Cir. 1988)
(upholding accountants' licensure requirement).
5. This does not mean that any and all licensing restrictions that apply to speakers-for-hire
are valid under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996,
1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating tour-guide licensing exam on free speech grounds); Nefedro
v. Montgomery Cty., 996 A.2d 850, 864 (Md. 2010) (invalidating fortune-telling licensure
requirement on free speech grounds).
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conduct and care.6 States can ban the prescription of certain medications,
impose liability and professional discipline for bad advice, and protect clients
from various harmful treatments or practices. They can also enforce rules of
evidence and procedure, impose sanctions for frivolous lawsuits, and prohibit
professionals from revealing client confidences.7 To be sure, some of these
measures regulate communications between professionals and their clients.
Nevertheless, they are typically considered merely incidental regulations of
speech, and as such are not generally subject to First Amendment challenge
or scrutiny.8
Despite these broad areas of authority over licensed professionals,
governments presumably do not have unlimited power to regulate
professionals' communications to their clients. In recent years, states have
been testing that assumption. State regulations of professional speech have
become more prevalent, more politically tinged, and more likely to structure
and dictate the specific content of professional-client interactions. A new
generation of professional speech regulations is placing considerable
pressure on doctrinal, theoretical, and professional boundaries.
The Article focuses on three recent examples. Florida enacted a law that
prohibits physicians from asking their patients about firearms possession,
unless the physician determines in good faith that the question is "necessary"
for effective treatment. 9 In a remarkable set of opinions demonstrating the
confusion surrounding professional speech, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit
thrice considered (and thrice upheid) the Florida law under three different
levels of First Amendment scrutiny-minimal, intermediate, and, finally,
strict. 10
California, New Jersey, and other states have recently barred licensed
psychiatrists and psychotherapists from providing so-called "reparative"
6. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining why medical malpractice
litigation does not raise free speech concerns).
7. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 569 ("Lawyers' freedom of speech is constrained in many
ways that no one would challenge seriously under the First Amendment.").
8. Professional-client advice is typically distinguished from communications that seek to
convey a commercial message or to solicit clients. Commercial advertising regulations are
generally reviewed under the commercial speech doctrine. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980) (announcing First Amendment
standard to be applied to commercial speech regulations).
9. The law also prohibits "harassment" of patients regarding firearms possession,
"discrimination" against patients as a result of firearms possession, and record-keeping with
regard to patients' firearms possession. See discussion infra Section I.B.
10. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1220 (11 th
Cir. 2014), vacated and superseded on reh 'g, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger
If), 797 F.3d 859 (11 th Cir. 2015), vacated and superseded on reh"g, Wollschlaeger v. Governor
of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015).
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therapies-talk-based treatments that purport to "cure" homosexuality and
other non-heterosexual orientations-to minor patients." Over a few
dissents, courts have upheld these bans too, either as regulations of
professional conduct not subject to First Amendment scrutiny or as
regulations of "professional speech" subject to a diminished level of
scrutiny. I2
Finally, a number of states have enacted laws that require physicians to
disclose detailed information to female patients in the context of abortion
consultations. 3 Some of these laws require that doctors convey state-
prescribed information regarding the fetus and view ultrasound images-
even if patients refuse to look or listen to what their physicians have to say. '4
Appeals courts have reached different conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of the abortion compelled disclosure laws, with many
upholding them under minimal or intermediate scrutiny. In a recent case, the
Fourth Circuit, departing from Fifth and Eighth Circuit decisions, invalidated
North Carolina's abortion display and description requirement as a content-
based regulation of speech.'5
Inquiry restrictions, treatment bans, and compulsory disclosure laws
highlight a number of doctrines and principles relating to state regulation of
professional-client interactions. Among other uncertainties, it is unclear
whether there is a category of "professional speech" that is subject to minimal
or no First Amendment scrutiny, whether interactions between clients and
professionals are properly considered conduct rather than speech, and what
standard of review ought to apply to regulation of professional-client
communications. 6 Important theoretical questions also remain unanswered.
Is protection of professional-client speech justified on the basis of collective
interests in self-government, or the search for truth? Is it a protected aspect
11. See discussion infra Section I.C.
12. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216,240 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey's
SOCE ban as to minor patients under intermediate scrutiny standard); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d
1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California's SOCE ban as to minor patients); see also Doe
ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting argument that New
Jersey's SOCE ban as to minors violated minor patients' right to receive information). But see
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O'Scannlain, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that in upholding the SOCE ban, the court has insulated the regulation of "politically unpopular
expression" from First Amendment scrutiny).
13. See discussion infra Section I.D.
14. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1324-28 (discussing mandatory abortion disclosure laws).
15. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina
ultrasound narration law on compulsory speech grounds).
16. See Halberstam, supra note 3, at 772 ("Current First Amendment analysis lacks a
coherent view of speech in the professions" and lacks a "paradigm for the First Amendment rights
of attorneys, physicians, or financial advisers when they communicate with their clients").
47:1289] 1293
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of the professional's liberty, the patient's autonomy, or both? Or do we need
a separate and distinct theoretical justification for protecting professional
expression?
This Article does not attempt to provide an overarching approach or theory
regarding professional speech, or answers to all of the above questions. 7
Rather, using the three examples, it focuses on a largely overlooked but
critical concern regarding state regulation of professional-client interactions.
States are using professional speech regulations to influence, alter, or even
prevent conversations about or concerning constitutional rights. All three of
the examples discussed in this Article intersect with and implicate
fundamental non-expressive constitutional rights-namely, the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, equality, and the right to abortion. This
intersection raises some distinctive and significant constitutional concerns.
Recently enacted professional speech regulations do not merely interfere with
the transmission and receipt of expert knowledge, transgress patients' and
professionals' rights to receive or impart information about medical care, or
implicate the activities of "knowledge communities"-some of the concerns
that have already been expressed by scholars.'8 They are troublesome for a
related but distinctive reason. These regulations suppress, alter, or dictate
professional rights speech-professional-client communications about,
concerning, or relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional
rights. 19
The intersection between professional speech and constitutional rights
distinguishes professional rights speech regulations from ordinary ethical,
standard of care, and licensure requirements. Unlike professional rights
speech regulations, these sorts of restrictions do not raise significant free
speech and other constitutional concerns. Recognition of the constitutional
dimension of some professional-client interactions also undermines the
formal distinction between private and public expression that the Supreme
Court, some lower courts, and some commentators have suggested
distinguishes "professional" from other kinds of speech.20 Professional-client
conversations about or concerning constitutional rights are neither wholly
private, nor part of a general public discourse. They are a special subset of
professional-client communications that relate to constitutional rights.
17. For a recent attempt to provide a general theory of professional speech, see Haupt, supra
note 3.
18. See generally POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3 (focusing on transmission of
information from expert to client); Haupt, supra note 3 (focusing on expertise of "knowledge
communities").
19. For a broader discussion of state regulation of speech about or concerning constitutional
rights, see generally Zick, supra note 1.
20. See infra Section I1I.C.
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In response to the argument that professionals are licensed by the state and
professional speech is thus entitled to minimal or less than full First
Amendment protection, the Article contends that the fact that dialogue
participants are professionals and their clients does not diminish the
constitutional concerns. Indeed, it highlights the fact that professionals are
frequently involved in educating, facilitating, and mediating the enjoyment
and exercise of clients' constitutional rights. The increasingly political resort
to professional speech regulations suggests that the relationship between the
state and professionals is undergoing significant changes, which may
necessitate additional limits, including meaningful First Amendment
constraints, on state authority regarding professional communications.
In addition to exposing the constitutional dimension of professional-client
interactions, the examples discussed in the Article also highlight a number of
other important gaps and conflicts in recent judicial decisions and the
professional speech literature. Courts and commentators have generally paid
inadequate attention to, or even misapplied, the First Amendment's speech-
conduct distinction, ignored the negative effects that recently enacted
regulations will have on professional independence and judgment, and failed
to consider their distinctly political purposes. These considerations also
counsel in favor of skepticism regarding, and heightened judicial review of,
professional rights speech regulations. In sum, professional speech
regulations that dictate or suppress content and impact conversations about
or concerning constitutional rights merit the highest scrutiny.2
Part I of the Article provides a brief overview of the incomplete
professional speech doctrine, and situates the three recent examples of
professional speech regulation within that doctrinal framework. Part II turns
to the distinctive constitutional issues raised by recent professional speech
regulations. Focusing in particular on the functions of professionals as they
relate to constitutional rights, it argues that regulations of professional rights
speech raise both expressive and non-expressive constitutional concerns. As
content-based regulations of speech about or concerning constitutional rights,
professional speech laws merit strict scrutiny. Finally, Part III critically
examines professional rights speech regulations in broader terms. It uses the
examples to question some of the premises concerning professionals in recent
judicial decisions, re-examine the speech-conduct distinction as it relates to
professional communications, analyze the purported distinction between
public and private professional speech, and raise concerns relating to
professional independence and judgment.
21. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (holding that
regulations based on subject matter and viewpoint are subject to strict scrutiny and presumptively
unconstitutional).
47:1289] 1295
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I. INQUIRY RESTRICTIONS, THERAPY BANS, AND COMPULSORY
DISCLOSURES
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance with regard to the
relationship between the First Amendment's expressive guarantees and
professional speech. Lower courts have been left to divine a doctrine from
concurrences, brief snippets in plurality opinions, and precedents in which
professional speech was regulated but no doctrinal framework materialized.
Recent regulations of professional-client communications highlight the need
for a more coherent doctrinal and theoretical approach, as they extend well
beyond the state's authority to impose ethical, evidentiary, or malpractice
standards. Part I begins with a brief overview of the Supreme Court's
unfinished doctrine of professional speech. It then discusses judicial review
of laws prohibiting firearms inquiries by physicians, banning so-called
"reparative" psychotherapies for gay minors, and compelling detailed
abortion disclosures by physicians.
A. The Incomplete Doctrine of Professional Speech
As much as the Supreme Court has engaged with the Free Speech Clause
over the years, it has said remarkably little about the regulation of
professional communications. The Court's first encounter with professional
speech arose in Thomas v. Collins," a case involving state power to enforce
a professional registration requirement against a union organizer. The
majority did not address the question whether the First Amendment places
any limits on state registration or licensure of the professions. In a
concurrence, Justice Jackson opined that the state could punish an individual
for engaging in the unlicensed practice of medicine or another profession, but
could not punish anyone for publicly advocating for or against any particular
school of medical thought. 23 Thomas thus suggested that states could exercise
regulatory power with regard to the licensed professions, consistent with the
Free Speech Clause. However, Justice Jackson's concurrence indicated that
the government's power to regulate public debate regarding matters within
professional fields of knowledge was subject to some limits.
In Lowe v. SEC, Justice White elaborated on this basic distinction between
private and public expression, in what has become an influential
concurrence.2 4 In Lowe, the Court held that the federal government could
impose a registration requirement on professionals who rendered
22. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
23. Id. at 544-45 (Jackson, J., concurring).
24. 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
1296 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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personalized advice to particular clients regarding securities investments.
However, in part owing to free speech concerns, the majority interpreted the
law such that the registration requirement was not applicable to the publisher
of an impersonal investment letter.25 Justice White's concurrence relied more
explicitly on First Amendment concerns. In an oft-cited passage, he wrote:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports
to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the
client's individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as
engaging in the practice of a profession. Just as offer and acceptance
are communications incidental to the regulable transaction called a
contract, the professional's speech is incidental to the conduct of the
profession. If the government enacts generally applicable licensing
provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the
profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom
of speech or the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where
the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist,
and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf
of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly
acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate
regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact on
speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such,
subject to the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ' '26
Justice White's concurrence advances the consideration of professional
speech in four potentially important respects. First, it provides a general
definition of professional speech-i.e., "takes the affairs of a client
personally in hand." Second, the concurrence notes that some professional
speech-speech "incidental to the regulable transaction"-is itself
"incidental to the conduct of the profession" and thus presumably not covered
by the Free Speech Clause.27 Third, Justice White observes that "generally
applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice
the profession" are not subject to First Amendment objection. 2s Fourth,
following Justice Jackson's concurrence in Thomas, the concurrence
identifies a private-public distinction that distinguishes between speech
communicated as a professional and speech communicated by a professional
as a citizen. As we will see, Justice White's Lowe concurrence has played a
significant role in lower courts' review of professional speech regulations.29
25. Id. at 208.
26. Id. at 232.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See discussion infra Section LB.
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Another fragment of the Supreme Court's approach to professional speech
appears in the Joint Opinion filed by three Justices in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.30 In Casey, the Court upheld a state law
that required physicians to disclose to female patients seeking an abortion the
nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and
the probable gestational age of the unborn child.3" After rejecting a due
process challenge to the disclosure provision, the Joint Opinion briefly
addressed the physicians' First Amendment claim:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about
the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the
State. To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard.. . , but only as part
of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State, cf Whalen v. Roe . . . We see no
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician
provide the information mandated by the State here.32
Casey did not establish any specific standard of review for professional
speech regulations. However, some lower courts have interpreted the Joint
Opinion to mean that the state has broad authority to mandate truthful and
non-misleading communications by physicians regarding abortion and its
effects.33
In a related context the Court raised, but ultimately avoided, questions
concerning the state's ability as subsidizer or speaker to dictate or compel
professional abortion speech. In Rust v. Sullivan,34 which was decided prior
to Casey, the Court rejected free speech challenges to a federal regulation that
prohibited physicians working at certain federally funded projects from
advocating or advising about abortion as a method of family planning.35 The
Court noted that even in the context of public subsidies, the government's
power to compel or prohibit physician communications might be limited.3 6
However, the Rust Court ultimately concluded that the regulations "d[id]
not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship."37 The Court
reasoned that the physician was not required to represent the government's
view regarding abortion as his own, and the professional relationship at the
30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. Id. at 884 (joint opinion).
32. Id.
33. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1324-28 (discussing mandatory abortion disclosure laws).
34. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
35. Id. at 196-99.
36. Id. at 200.
37. Id.
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funded projects was not "sufficiently all encompassing" in that it did not
include post-conception medical care.38 Rust indicates that governments have
substantial authority to insist on speech conditions when they fund family
planning activities, and are not generally restrained by the First Amendment
when they seek to communicate their own messages about abortion.
However, even when it funds projects or programs, Rust observes that the
government may not fundamentally alter the physician-patient relationship
by dictating or restricting professional speech.39
The Supreme Court has decided three recent cases involving professional
speech, each of which potentially adds to the development of the professional
speech doctrine. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez," the Court invalidated
a federal funding condition that prohibited fund recipients from providing
legal advice that concerned efforts to amend or otherwise challenge existing
welfare laws.'" The Court observed that the funding condition was not
designed to communicate any governmental message, and that it
"prohibit[ed] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the
proper exercise of the judicial power. "42 Thus, unlike the spending condition
in Rust, the funding condition in Velazquez significantly impinged on the
relationship between lawyers and their clients as well as the relationship
between lawyers and the courts. Velazquez did not address the subject of
"professional speech" directly. The decision did not establish any First
Amendment standard of review for professional speech regulations.
In Milavetz v. United States,43 the Court upheld a federal law that
prohibited bankruptcy lawyers from advising their clients to incur more debt
in contemplation of a bankruptcy filing. 4 The Court concluded that the law
was properly considered a regulation of abusive and unethical conduct, rather
than protected expression.45 Milavetz suggests that professional standards of
care can provide at least partial guidance concerning the proper scope of
professional speech regulations. Again, however, the Court did not elaborate
on the free speech implications of professional speech regulations.
Finally, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,46 the Court upheld
application of a federal law barring the provision of material support to
38. Id.
39. See Halberstam, supra note 3, at 774-75 (discussing Rust's implications for professional
speech); Haupt, supra note 3, at 20-21 (same).
40. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
41. Id. at 536-37.
42. Id. at 545.
43. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 244-46.
46. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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foreign terrorist groups to professionals who sought to provide legal advice
to members of the designated groups. Notably, the Court rejected the
government's argument that the provision of legal advice was a form of
conduct not entitled to First Amendment coverage.47 However, the Court
ultimately upheld the content-based law as a narrowly tailored measure
supporting compelling national security and foreign relations interests. 48
Humanitarian Law Project suggests that the provision of expert professional
advice cannot be categorically characterized as conduct outside the coverage
of the First Amendment. However, it did not establish any doctrinal
framework for the regulation of professional speech.
These various concurrences, plurality opinions, and recent decisions
provide limited guidance to legislatures, courts, and professionals regarding
governmental authority to prohibit or compel professional-client
communications. In general, they establish that government can sometimes
treat professional advice communicated within the professional-client
relationship differently from speech that is part of public discourse. Thus, a
physician advising a patient regarding possible medical treatments would
presumably be engaged in professional speech subject to state regulation,
while an attorney writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper regarding
limits on punitive damages would be participating in public discourse
covered by the Free Speech Clause. However, beyond this very simplistic
private-public speech dichotomy, the specific doctrinal contours regarding
professional speech remain remarkably unclear. Among other things, the
specific boundaries of the state's licensure authority, the relationship between
protected professional expression and unprotected conduct, and the standard
of First Amendment scrutiny that applies to professional speech regulations
are undecided or under-developed.
In the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have tried to extract a doctrine of professional speech from existing bits and
pieces.49 The three examples discussed below-inquiry bans, therapy bans,
and compulsory disclosures-provide a sense of the difficulties,
inconsistencies, and conflicts associated with this effort.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 38-39.
49. See infra Sections 1.B-D; see also Kry, supra note 3, at 913-14, 929-46 (discussing
application of this approach to cases involving computer software and the unauthorized practice
of law).
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B. Firearms Inquiry Restrictions
In 2011, Florida enacted the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act. 0 The Act was
passed, at the urging of the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), after some
Floridians complained that their physicians had engaged in "political"
inquiries regarding arms possession. The Act prohibits doctors from asking
patients about gun ownership unless they consider the information to be
"relevant to the patient's medical care or safety, or the safety of others."'" The
Act also prohibits placing such information in medical records when the
physician knows such information is "not relevant to the patient's medical
care or safety, or the safety of others."52 Finally, the law provides that
physicians "may not discriminate" against gun owners and "should refrain
from unnecessarily harassing" them during an examination, although it
protects the physician's right to choose his or her patients.53 Violation of any
aspect of the law-the inquiry ban, medical records provision, or
discrimination/harassment provision---can result in a $10,000 fine and loss
of a medical license.
5 4
A group of physicians challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing
that it was common practice in the medical field to ask about gun possession
in oral communications and on safety questionnaires distributed to patients
regarding their home environment. 5 A district court invalidated the law on
free speech grounds.56 In three separate opinions, a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit reversed.
In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida (Wollschlaeger 1), the panel
initially held that the Florida Act was "a valid regulation of professional
conduct that has only an 'incidental effect on [physicians'] speech."'"7 In a
lengthy dissent, Judge Wilson rejected the majority's argument that the Act
was analogous to the general medical malpractice regime, which regulates
courses of treatment. 8 Rather, he characterized the Act as a viewpoint-
discriminatory measure that sought "to silence firearm-safety messages that
were perceived as 'political attacks' and as part of a 'political agenda' against
50. Firearm Owners' Privacy Act, ch. 2011-112,2011 Fla. Laws 1776 (2011) (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 381.026, 395.1055, 456.072, 790.338 (2011)).
51. Id. § 790.338(2).
52. Id. § 790.338(1).
53. Id. § 790.338(5)-(6).
54. Id. § 456.072(2)(b), (d).
55. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
56. Id.
57. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1217 (1 1th Cir.
2014) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1250-51 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
47:1289] 1301
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firearm ownership."5 9 With regard to Florida's purported interest in
protecting gun-owners' Second Amendment rights, Judge Wilson wrote:
"That we have a right to do something does not mean we have a right to be
free from questioning about that right or from suggestions of other people..
. who may tell us that exercising a particular right in a particular way is a bad
idea. ' 60 "The Second Amendment," he wrote, "does not include a right to be
free from private persuasion. 61
A year later, in Wollschlaeger II, the panel vacated its initial opinion. 62
The court first determined that the Florida Act's inquiry restriction, record-
keeping, and harassment provisions regulated speech, rather than conduct.63
It then derived a "framework" under which physician communications were
subject to full or lesser First Amendment scrutiny based on whether the
speech was "in furtherance of the practice of medicine" and took place
"within a fiduciary relationship."' Under this "two-dimensional model," a
physician's speech to a crowd at a rally is fully protected, while her
communications relating to treatment in the examining room are subject to
less than full protection. 65 Applying a form of intermediate scrutiny, the panel
held that the Florida Act was tailored to directly advance the state's interests
in safeguarding the privacy of patients and regulating the practice of
medicine. 66 Judge Wilson again wrote a lengthy dissent, in which he argued
that the Florida Act was an invalid viewpoint-based regulation of speech on
a matter of public concern-firearms safety. 67 He again rejected the
majority's characterization of the law as a regulation of speech within a
fiduciary professional relationship, akin to a licensing or malpractice
scheme.68 Finally, Judge Wilson again rejected Florida's contention that the
law served a substantial interest in protecting patients from conversations
about firearms possession.69
Remarkably, fewer than six months later, the same Eleventh Circuit panel
issued yet another opinion. In Wollschlaeger III, the panel repeated its
conclusions that the inquiry, record-keeping, and harassment provisions of
59. Id. at 1239.
60. Id. at 1263.
61. Id.
62. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 797 F.3d 859, 868 (11 th Cir.
2014).
63. id. at 884-86.
64. Id. at 888.
65. Id. at 889.
66. Id. at 897-900.
67. Id. at 908 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 911-12. See also id. at 918-19 (comparing the Florida Act to medical malpractice
and other rules that incidentally burden speech).
69. Id. at 926.
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the Florida Act regulated speech such that First Amendment scrutiny was
required.70 The panel repeated its two-dimensional model-supplemented
this time with a grid purporting to show that physician communications made
"in furtherance of the practice of medicine" and within a professional-client
relationship constitute professional speech, which is subject to a lesser level
of First Amendment scrutiny.7' However, the court held that the Florida Act
satisfied even strict scrutiny.72 In its third opinion, the majority elaborated
significantly on the state's compelling interests. It chiefly focused on the
protection of Second Amendment rights, and privacy in terms of the exercise
of the right to bear arms. 73 The court concluded that the Act "protects the right
to keep and bear arms by protecting patients from irrelevant questioning
about guns that could dissuade them from exercising their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. 74 It also concluded that the Florida law was tailored to the
compelling interest in treating the privacy of firearms ownership as
"sacrosanct" and acting to protect such privacy.75 Judge Wilson again filed a
dissent, but declined to respond to what he called "the Majority's evolving
rationale. 7
6
The Wollschlaeger trilogy demonstrates both the uncertainty of the
doctrine of professional speech and the considerable confusion in the lower
courts regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to laws like the
Florida Act. As the court ultimately acknowledged, such laws regulate
speech, not conduct. Moreover, they regulate a constitutional dimension of
the professional-client relationship. In the end, the majority concluded that
the state had the power to protect firearms owners from physician inquiries
that might dissuade them from owning arms. Judge Wilson's dissents
contended that the First Amendment does not permit the state to shield
audiences from private speech about or concerning the right to bear arms.
C. Reparative Therapy Bans
California, New Jersey, and a few other jurisdictions have recently enacted
treatment bans in the context of state regulation of licensed psychotherapists.
70. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *13-15 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015).
71. id. at *20-21, *20 n. 15; see also id. at *23 ("When the State seeks to regulate speech by
professionals in a context in which the State's interest in regulating for the protection of the public
is more deeply rooted, a lesser level of scrutiny applies.").
72. See id. at * 19 ("we ultimately hold that the Act satisfies even strict scrutiny.").
73. See id. at *24-31 (discussing compelling interests).
74. Id. at *25.
75. Id. at *26.
76. Id. at *32 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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These states have enacted laws that ban licensed psychotherapists from
engaging in "reparative" talk therapies with minor patients.77
Professional associations and societies contend that Sexual Orientation
Change Efforts ("SOCE"), as the therapies are sometimes called, are
ineffectual and actually harm patients.78 Older SOCE therapies were
generally aversive, involving treatments such as inducing nausea or
vomiting.79 Newer, non-aversive treatments attempt "to change gay men's
and lesbians' thought patterns by refraining desires, redirecting thoughts, or
using hypnosis, with the goal of changing sexual arousal, behavior, and
orientation."' 0 As practitioners have described the approach, "counselors may
begin a session by inquiring into potential 'root causes' of homosexual
behavior, such as childhood sexual trauma or other developmental issues,
such as a distant relationship with the same-sex parent."'" Counselors might
then "attempt to effect sexual orientation change by discussing 'traditional,
gender-appropriate behaviors and characteristics"' and how the client can
foster them.82
California's SOCE ban prohibits licensed medical professionals from
engaging in any practices that seek to change a minor's sexual orientation.83
Use of the prohibited treatments constitutes "unprofessional conduct" and
could result in professional discipline by the licensing entity.8 4 The ban does
not extend to efforts to "provide acceptance, support, and understanding of
clients or the facilitation of clients' coping, social support, and identity
exploration and development" and "do[es] not seek to change sexual
orientation."85 The SOCE ban also does not prohibit licensed medical
professionals from expressing their views concerning reparative therapies to
minor patients, from speaking about SOCE outside the therapist-patient
relationship, or from referring minor patients to unlicensed providers who
could perform reparative therapies. 6
77. See CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §§ 865(b)(1)-865.1 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-
54, 55 (West 2013); see also Adam Serwer, Efforts to Ban "Gay Conversion" Therapy Stall in
the States, MSNBC (Aug. 8, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ex-gay-therapy-
bans-stall-the-states (reporting on legislative activity on the SOCE issue in various states).
78. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing opinions of
medical and psychological community).
79. See id. at 1222.
80. JUDITH M. GLASSGOLD ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, APPROPRIATE
THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 22 (2009).
81. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2014).
82. Id.
83. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 865(b)(1)-865.1 (West 2012).
84. Id. § 865.2.
85. Id. § 865(b)(2)(A)-(B).
86. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Therapists using "non-aversive" forms of SOCE challenged the California
ban on First Amendment grounds, claiming that it violated their free speech
rights to communicate with minor patients.87 In Pickup v. Brown, a panel of
Ninth Circuit judges rejected the free speech claim.88 The court distilled from
Supreme Court and circuit precedents a framework in which the state's power
to regulate speech about therapies was more limited than its power to restrict
the therapies themselves.89 As to whether SOCE therapies involved speech or
conduct, the court posited a "continuum," with public dialogue at one end,
professional advice in the context of a patient-client relationship at the
midpoint, and professional conduct at the opposite end.90 The court located
SOCE at the conduct end of the continuum, where the "state's power is great,
even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on speech." 9' It
emphasized that the mere fact that the banned course of treatment was carried
out through speech did not turn the ban into a regulation of speech. 92 In
contrast to the speech at issue in Humanitarian Law Project, the court said,
SOCE is a form of conduct with no expressive element. 93 It concluded:
"Pursuant to its police power, California has authority to regulate licensed
mental health providers' administration of therapies that the legislature has
deemed harmful." 94
The court reasoned that since the California law did not prohibit
professionals from expressing their views regarding SOCE or even
recommending it to some patients, the law only incidentally burdened speech
and was subject to review only for rationality. 95 Although it acknowledged
that studies of SOCE had "methodological problems," the court concluded
that "anecdotal reports of harm raise serious concerns about the safety of
SOCE." 96 The court held that these concerns, along with the opinions of
professional organizations that SOCE has not been shown to be effective,
were sufficient to justify the ban.97
Some Ninth Circuit judges thought the First Amendment claim had
substantially more merit. Three judges, dissenting from a denial of rehearing
en banc, argued that California's SOCE ban is "a new and powerful tool to
87. Id. at 1225.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1227.
90. See id. at 1227-29 (describing continuum).
91. Id. at 1229.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1230.
94. ld. at 1229.
95. Id. at 1231 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
96. Id. at 1224.
97. Id. at 1232.
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silence expression based on a political or moral judgment about the content
and purpose of the communications." 98 The dissenters relied heavily on
Humanitarian Law Project, which they said rejected the speech-conduct
"labeling game" engaged in by the panel.99 Further, they contended that "[t]he
Federal courts have never recognized a freestanding exception to the First
Amendment for state professional regulations."' 00 Unlike a regulation
concerning prescription of banned substances, which simply refuses legal
effect to the written words on the prescription pad, the dissenters observed
that the California law "prohibits the doctor from speaking to his patient with
certain words and in a certain way."''
In King v. Christie,02 the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey's SOCE ban.
The language of the New Jersey law is identical in all relevant respects to the
California SOCE ban, and a violation of the ban may result in professional
discipline. 03 In passing the law, the New Jersey legislature made findings
emphasizing that being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, and cited
reports from mental health organizations regarding the harms associated with
SOCE therapy. 104
Parting company with the district court and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Pickup, the Third Circuit held that SOCE therapy is speech, not conduct, and
that as such it "enjoys some degree of protection under the First
Amendment."' 05 The court relied primarily on Humanitarian Law Project for
the proposition that the provision of professional advice does not constitute
pure conduct. 10 6 Owing to the fact that the speech is communicated "within
the confines of a professional relationship," however, the court concluded
that free speech protection was "diminished."'' 0 7 It read Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Thomas, Justice White's Lowe concurrence, and Casey's Joint
Opinion as establishing broader state authority to regulate the professions in
order to ensure their preservation and characteristics such as patient trust and
confidence.'0 8 While the function of professional speech did not render it
98. Id. at 1216 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc,
joined by Bea and Ikuta, Circuit Judges).
99. Id. at 1217-18.
100. Id. at 1218.
101. Id. at 1220.
102. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
103. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-55, 45:1-21(h) (West 2013), with CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 865(b)(1)-865.1, 865.2 (West 2012).
104. See id. § 45:1-54.
105. King, 767 F.3d at 224.
106. See id. at 225 ("[T]he Supreme Court rejected this very proposition in [Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010)].").
107. Id. at 224.
108. See id. at 230-32 (discussing Supreme Court opinions and lower court applications).
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conduct outside the First Amendment's coverage, the court concluded that "it
does place it within a recognized category of speech that is not entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment."' 9
In fashioning its standard of "diminished" protection, the court drew an
analogy to the commercial speech doctrine." 0 Under that doctrine, the
Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to regulations of speech that
proposes a commercial transaction." Emphasizing the "informational
function" of professional speech and the history of state regulation of
professional-client communications, the Third Circuit concluded that
"professional speech should receive the same level of First Amendment
protection as that afforded commercial speech.""' Accordingly, it held, the
SOCE ban was permissible only if it directly advances the state's substantial
interest in protecting minor clients and is not more extensive than necessary
to serve that purpose."
3
The court emphasized that this diminished level of scrutiny only applied
to state regulations "enacted pursuant to the State's interest in protecting its
citizens from ineffective or harmful professional services. "'1 By contrast, the
court wrote, regulations of professionals' speech that were not related to state
licensure may be subject to a higher level of scrutiny." 5 It distinguished
Casey on the ground that the provision under review in that case compelled
truthful and non-misleading information; regulations of this sort, said the
court, were subject to more deferential review under the commercial speech
doctrine." 6 Further, the court worried that under rationality review states
"could too easily suppress disfavored ideas under the guise of professional
regulation."" 7
On the other hand, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that strict
scrutiny applied to the SOCE ban. Although it acknowledged that the ban
was content-based, the court concluded that it did not discriminate "in an
impermissible manner" because the basis for the SOCE ban was tailored to
109. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 234-35.
111. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-
63 (1980) (holding that commercial speech enjoys only diminished protection owing in part to
special concerns such as consumer fraud); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding that commercial speech enjoys some First
Amendment protection).
112. King, 767 F.3d at 234-35.
113. Id. at 235 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
114. Id.
115. See id. (discussing the regulations in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1,
8 (2010) and Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001)).
116. Id. at 236.
117. Id.
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concerns about client harm. 118 Finally, the court rejected the argument that
the ban discriminated based on viewpoint because the law allowed medical
professionals to express their views about SOCE to anyone, including their
minor patients.'19 The SOCE ban, said the court, only prevented plaintiffs
from expressing this viewpoint "in a very specific way-by actually
rendering the professional services that they believe to be effective and
beneficial."'2 0
Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court concluded that
protection of minor patients was undoubtedly a substantial state interest. '21 It
also concluded that the legislature, through its findings and record, had
demonstrated that the SOCE ban would directly advance this interest. 2 2 This
was so, the court said, even though the empirical evidence regarding SOCE's
harmful effects "falls short of the demanding standards imposed by the
scientific community.' 1 23 The court stated that the legislature's conclusion
was not "unreasonable" under the circumstances, and that it did not have to
"wait for conclusive scientific evidence before acting to protect its citizens
from serious threats of harm.' 24 Last, the court concluded that the SOCE ban
was no more extensive than necessary to protect against the harms associated
with reparative therapies. 125
Like the three Eleventh Circuit opinions upholding the Florida firearms
inquiry and record-keeping ban, the SOCE cases highlight the considerable
confusion regarding the appropriate level of First Amendment protection for
professional speech. The two federal courts of appeals that have considered
SOCE bans thus far came to different conclusions regarding (1) whether talk
therapy is speech or conduct, (2) the standard of review to apply to
professional speech regulations, and (3) the scope of states' authority to
regulate professional-client interactions pursuant to their licensing power.
The incomplete doctrine of professional speech does not provide clear
answers concerning any of these issues.
118. Id. at 237.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 237-38.
122. Id. at 238-39.
123. Id. at 239.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 240.
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D. Compulsory Abortion-Related Disclosures
States have long compelled professionals to make certain disclosures to
their clients and patients, as a matter of both common and statutory law. This
has traditionally been considered part of a patient's "informed consent" to
care, treatment, or representation. 126Some of the most controversial compelled disclosure requirements have
concerned the subject of abortion. Shortly after Roe v. Wade recognized a
constitutional right to procure an abortion,127 the Supreme Court clarified that
state and federal governments were not required to fund or otherwise support
access to abortion services. 2 The Court also confirmed that governments
were entitled to make a "value judgment," through the allocation of funds or
other means, that childbirth was preferable to abortion.2 9 Later, in Casey, the
Court established that government is permitted to seek to persuade women
not to exercise their constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy,
so long as it does not coerce women or otherwise unduly interfere with the
abortion decision. 130
Applying this framework in Casey, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania
requirement that compelled physicians, within twenty-four hours of
performing an abortion, to "inform the woman of the nature of the procedure,
the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational
age of the unborn child."'II3 The Court reasoned that the state was entitled
"to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even
when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion."'32 In a subsequent case involving late-term abortions, the Court
emphasized that the government was entitled through laws and regulations to
express "respect for the dignity of human life" and to "use its voice and its
126. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in
Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1602-04 (2008) (discussing informed consent
requirement under common and statutory law).
127. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
128. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980) (rejecting challenges to the Hyde
Amendment, which barred payments even for most medically necessary abortions); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding denial of Medicaid funds for abortion services).
129. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
130. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992).
13 1. Id. at 881(quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)(ii) (1990)). The provision allowed
the physician to decline to provide the disclosures if he determined they would be harmful to the
patient. Id. at 884-85.
132. Id. at 883.
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regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman." 
133
Under Casey's framework, with regard to the pregnant woman's decision
whether to bear a child, the government is permitted to (1) take steps "to
ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed;" (2) "enact rules and
regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and
social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term;" and (3) enact a "reasonable
framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting
meaning."'1 4 As one commentator has observed, Casey sanctioned a
framework in which the state could "structure the woman's decision-making
process" and "open up the expressive channels of speech to the pregnant
woman while she is engaged in deliberation about her choice. 1 35 The Court
was essentially "granting leeway to the government to voice its own
opposition to abortion. '"136
As discussed earlier, the Casey opinion rejected, in a brief paragraph, the
physicians' claim that the informational requirements compelled speech in
violation of the First Amendment.1 3 The Court concluded that the state had
the power to compel professional speech pursuant to its authority to license
the practice of medicine.1 38 Since Casey, many legislatures have enacted
measures that structure conversations between women and their physicians
regarding the subject of abortion by compelling disclosures. 13 9
Compelled abortion disclosure regulations differ from the first two
examples of professional speech regulation in certain respects. Most
obviously, in contrast to inquiry and therapy bans, abortion informed consent
requirements compel the communication of specific information. Thus, these
laws implicate First Amendment principles and doctrines relating to the right
not to speak. 140 Further, unlike the inquiry and therapy bans, which are quite
recent, abortion informed consent requirements are part of a longstanding
relationship among informed consent, freedom of speech, and the right to
133. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127-28 (2007).
134. Casey, 550 U.S. at 872.
135. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 802.
136. Id. at 791.
137. Casey, 550 U.S. at 884.
138. Id. (rejecting compelled speech claim).
139. For commentary on compulsory abortion speech, see generally Corbin, supra note 3;
Keighley, supra note 3; Post, Informed Consent, supra note 3; and Sanger, supra note 3.
140. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (no government
official may "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"). See also Corbin, supra
note 3, at 1282-91 (discussing compelled speech doctrine in context of compulsory abortion
disclosures).
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obtain an abortion. Abortion speech regulations proliferated in the 1 990s after
Casey, which indicated that neither the Due Process Clause nor the First
Amendment generally prohibited their enforcement. 4 '
State abortion-related compelled disclosures take different forms. Some
laws impose detailed scripts on physicians. For example, South Dakota law
requires that abortion providers tell patients that abortion will "terminate the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being" and that "the pregnant
woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human being.' ' 42 The
doctor must also explain "all known medical risks" of abortion, including the
"increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.' 1 43  Rejecting First
Amendment compelled speech claims, federal courts have upheld both the
"human being" and suicide advisory scripts as valid informed consent
provisions. 144
Other state laws, sometimes referred to as "speech and display," require
that an ultrasound be displayed to the woman and that doctors provide a
detailed description of the image (including information about limbs, vital
organs, position in the uterus, etc.). 145 Women can sometimes refuse to view
the sonogram itself, but they must generally be informed of the sonogram
results and must sign an informed consent form certifying that they have
received the information. The speech and display laws are an outgrowth of
Casey's structured discourse framework, in which the state is empowered to
provide truthful and non-misleading information in an effort to persuade
women not to choose abortion. 46
Federal courts have generally upheld compulsory disclosure requirements,
largely on the basis of Casey's determination that truthful and non-misleading
disclosure provisions are valid under informed consent principles. 47 The
141. See Zick, supra note 1, at 36-38 (discussing the relationship between compelled
abortion disclosures and the right to abortion).
142. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)-(c) (2015).
143. Id. § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015).
144. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 11), 686 F.3d 889, 906
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 1), 530 F.3d
724, 738 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating preliminary injunction); Planned Parenthood of Ind.,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892, 916, 918 (S.D. Ind. 2011)
(upholding requirement that physicians inform abortion patients that "human physical life begins
when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm") (quoting IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E)
(2011)).
145. See, eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
90-21.85(a)(2), (a)(4) (West 2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(C)-(D)
(West 2015).
146. See Post, Informed Consent, supra note 3, at 945-46.
147. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577
(5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting compelled speech claim brought by physicians); Rounds 1, 530 F.3d at
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decisions have not comprehensively considered the First Amendment free
speech implications of compulsory abortion disclosures. Rather, they have
treated compulsory abortion disclosures as a legitimate means of requiring
disclosure of truthful, non-misleading information about abortion. 148
However, as some commentators have observed, the state script and display
laws go beyond ordinary informed consent requirements by requiring
communication of false and misleading, 49 and in some cases ideological,
statements regarding abortion. 5 ' Some have complained that courts are
applying an "abortion exception" to compulsory speech doctrine. 1 '
A few federal courts have invalidated compulsory abortion disclosures on
free speech grounds. 52 Recently, in Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit
invalidated provisions of North Carolina's compulsory abortion disclosure
law. The law requires physicians to perform an ultrasound, display a
sonogram, and describe the fetus in detail to a woman seeking an abortion in
the state.'53 Under the law, the sonogram display and fetal description, which
the law described as the "Display of Real-Time View Requirement," must
take place even if the woman actively seeks to avert her eyes or refuses to
listen.'54 These disclosures were in addition to a comprehensive series of
informed consent abortion disclosures already required under North Carolina
law. 155
The Fourth Circuit held that the Display of Real-Time View Requirement
"is quintessential compelled speech" because it "forces physicians to say
things they otherwise would not say.' 1 56 Moreover, the court held, "the
statement compelled here is ideological" in the sense that it "explicitly
promotes a pro-life message by demanding the provision of facts that all fall
on one side of the abortion debate-and does so shortly before the time of
737-38 (rejecting compelled speech claim brought by physicians). See generally the discussion
in Corbin, supra note 3, at 1324-38.
148. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575-76; Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 738.
149. For instance, the statement that abortion is associated with an increased risk of suicide
has been characterized as misleading. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion
and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2415-16 (2014).
150. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1329-34. See generally Post, Informed Consent, supra note
3; Sanger, supra note 3.
151. Corbin, supra note 3, at 1289-90.
152. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina
ultrasound narration law on compulsory speech grounds).
153. See id. at 243 (describing requirements under North Carolina's "Woman's Right to
Know Act").
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(a) (West 2011).
155. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 243 (describing additional informed consent disclosure
provisions).
156. Id. at 246.
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decision when the intended recipient is most vulnerable."' 5 7 To the contention
that physicians were not required to follow any particular script and could
express their own views regarding abortion, the court responded: "That the
doctor may supplement the compelled speech with his own perspective does
not cure the coercion-the government's message still must be delivered
(though not necessarily received)."' 58
Canvassing the various free speech standards of review, ranging from
minimal rationality for professional conduct to strict scrutiny, the Fourth
Circuit settled on "heightened intermediate scrutiny."' 59 This demanding
standard was appropriate, the court said, because the state was regulating not
just what physicians did in the context of a professional relationship but also
what they said. 6 ' It specifically rejected the argument that the single
paragraph in Casey established a rational basis standard for all abortion-
related physician speech. ' 6' The court invalidated the display and description
requirement, concluding that it burdened physician speech in a broad and
unprecedented manner "while simultaneously threatening harm to the
patient's psychological health, interfering with the physician's professional
judgment, and compromising the doctor-patient relationship.' 62
II. PROFESSIONAL SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In previous work, I have argued that regulations of rights speech-
communications about or concerning the recognition, scope, or exercise of
constitutional rights-are suspect under the First Amendment. 163 Rights
speech regulations are prevalent. They impact speech across a range of
contexts, and with respect to a variety of constitutional rights. 164 Sometimes,
as in the examples discussed in this Article, the regulation of professional-
client communications implicates rights speech concerns. This Part provides
rights-speech-based reasons to be skeptical of regulations like physician
inquiry bans, therapy bans, and compulsory disclosures. Restrictions on what
I will call "professional rights speech" affect much more than professional
advice regarding specific treatments, conditions, or problems. They affect the
free flow of information about constitutional and legal rights. They also
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 249.
162. Id. at 250.
163. See generally Zick, supra note 1.
164. See id. at 6-34 (discussing a variety of regulations of speech concerning abortion and
the right to bear arms).
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implicate important, but often overlooked, professional functions relating to
the enforcement of those rights. The fact that the speakers and listeners are
professionals and clients does not diminish these concerns, or give states
greater discretion to regulate communications that bear on constitutional
concerns. To the contrary, laws and regulations that suppress or compel
professional rights speech based explicitly on content raise distinctive
constitutional concerns and warrant strict judicial scrutiny.
A. Professionals, Speech, and State Licensure
When considering whether any First Amendment coverage or protection
ought to exist in the professional setting, we must begin with a fundamental
concept of the professional-client relationship itself. Professional speech
regulations implicate and affect special relationships and interests. In this
sense, they are not like ordinary speech regulations. Rather, they are
analogous to restrictions on student speech, or public employee speech. They
regulate a special kind of relationship and operate in a distinctive sphere.
Professionals 65 advise clients with regard to various medical, legal,
therapeutic, or related concerns within the professional's field of expertise.
.They do so in the context of a relationship that is defined, or circumscribed,
by professional standards and that is generally characterized by information
asymmetries. 166 Professionals provide advice based upon their expertise in a
particular discipline. They deliver advice in a wide variety of ways, many of
which are communicative. For example, professionals prescribe medications,
file briefs, perform accounting functions, and provide family therapies. They
interview clients, take their histories, write advisory opinions, and dispense
all manner of expert advice. Although generalizing across the range of
disciplines is typically difficult, it is safe to say that professionals engage in
significant communicative activities in the context of their defined
professional relationships.
165. Here and throughout, I am referring primarily to the sort of "knowledge communities"
identified by Haupt, supra note 3, and others who have examined professional speech. In general,
these are the medical, psychological, legal, and scientific professions. Other disciplines, including
accounting and education, may also fall into this sphere. Typically, where a professional
dispenses, and a client relies upon, a special body of knowledge or expertise, we may label the
relationship "professional." Whether regulations of other licensed professionals, including tour
guides and nail technicians, implicate the professional speech doctrine is beyond the scope of this
discussion. For purpose of this Article. at least, the discussion will focus on the learned
professions.
166. See Halberstam, supra note 3, at 846 (characterizing professional speech as "an
important, albeit bounded, communicative realm that is worthy of constitutional protection").
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Through the enforcement of professional standards, the state pursues
undoubtedly important interests. These include protecting clients from
professional overreaching, fraud, and other harms. In important respects, the
limits of governmental authority in this context are principally defined by
interests in fostering and facilitating safe professional-client interactions, in
the context of informational and power asymmetries, and in ensuring that
experts provide accurate and truthful information to their clients. 67
In defending recent professional speech regulations, states have relied
heavily on their power to license professionals. State licensure limits access
to the profession to those who satisfy the knowledge and other expertise
requirements of the discipline. Licensure also facilitates state oversight and a
degree of control, again for the primary purpose of ensuring that professionals
have the requisite expertise and do not engage in harmful practices.
However, professional licensure does not eliminate any and all First
Amendment concerns regarding professional-client communications.'68
Thus, for example, public school teachers are licensed by the state, but not
all of their speech automatically falls outside the boundaries of the Free
Speech Clause as a consequence of licensure. 69 Some government
contractors are also licensed by the state, yet they too retain some First
Amendment rights. 70 If licensure itself eliminated First Amendment
coverage, states would be able to suppress or disturb the free flow of
information about a host of matters of public concern-including
constitutional and legal rights. Fundamental First Amendment doctrines and
values firmly reject this result.
State licensure principally regulates the act ofjoining a profession. It does
not, by itself, justify any and all state restrictions on communications between
licensed professionals and the public, or licensed professionals and their
individual clients. This Article specifically contends that the exercise of state
licensure power in the context of some professional-client interactions raises
significant constitutional concerns. This is especially, but not only, the case
167. See, e.g., Post, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 48 ("[W]e should expect to see First
Amendment coverage triggered whenever government seeks.., to disrupt the communication of
accurate expert knowledge."); Halberstam, supra note 3, at 845-46 (stating the permissible scope
of regulation of professional speech "must be determined [by] the nature of the underlying
relationship"); Haupt, supra note 3, at 37-41 (arguing that the scope of protection for professional
speech is defined by the state of the art in the "knowledge communit[y]").
168. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) ("[T]he rights of free speech and
a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.").
169. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(holding that public school teacher did not relinquish First Amendment free speech rights by
virtue of his employment by the school district).
170. Cf Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1996) (holding that public
contractors retained First Amendment rights against retaliatory action).
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where states regulate communications that concern fundamental
constitutional rights.
B. Professionals and Rights
Most professional-client interactions focus on addressing the particular
conditions or problems of the clients who seek treatment or representation.
This does not mean that the information disseminated and shared during these
interactions has no public value. To the contrary, as the examples in Part I all
show, the supposed distinction between public and private communications
flagged by Justice White in Lowe and relied on by some lower courts ignores
an important connection between professional communications and discourse
on matters of public concern. 7 '
Far more often than is typically acknowledged, professional-client
interactions address issues relating to constitutional and other legal rights.
Licensed professionals play an important role in ensuring the free flow of
accurate information about constitutional rights. They educate clients with
respect to the scope and exercise of rights. Their advice may provoke political
activism with respect to rights. 172 More generally, professionals facilitate the
exercise of a wide variety of rights. Thus, restrictions on professional
communications may affect far more than the provision of professional
advice regarding a client's personal concerns. Some restrictions may impact
discussions and decisions regarding the exercise of civil and constitutional
rights relating to matters such as reproductive rights and racial equality.
In certain contexts, the connection between professional speech and
constitutional rights is very close. For example, as Kathleen Sullivan has
observed, lawyers are frequently "vindicators of constitutional rights against
the state.' 73 Lawyers' advice and other professional activities can have a
profound impact on the scope and enjoyment of constitutional rights for
individual clients and the public at large. Through their expressive activities,
including the advice they provide to individual clients, lawyers frequently
seek to check governmental power and protect the constitutional rights of
clients.
Supreme Court precedents expressly acknowledge the important
intersection between the speech of legal professionals and constitutional
rights. Thus, the Court has invalidated restrictions on lawyers' solicitation of
171. See discussion infra Section III.C.
172. Cf Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that if physicians
and patients were permitted to discuss a ban on medical marijuana, "the patient upon receiving
the recommendation could petition the government to change the law").
173. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 571.
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clients for lawsuits alleging violations of constitutional rights. 174 The Court's
precedents have also treated litigation on behalf of constitutional equality as
a form of political expression and association. 175 The connection between
lawyers' expression and constitutional rights also explains why the Court has
jealously guarded lawyers' ability to defend their clients in the press. 17 6
Indeed, even when governments subsidize legal representation and advice,
the Court has held that they may not deny funding in a manner that
fundamentally alters the adversary system or denies courts critically
important information. 177
Of course, lawyers are natural and even quintessential state adversaries.
The connection between their speech and constitutional rights is bound to be
somewhat closer than is the case with other professionals. Physicians and
psychotherapists, not to mention marriage counselors and other
professionals, are not typically involved in direct conflicts with the state on
their clients' behalf.
However, a surprising number of non-legal professionals perform
important functions relating to their clients' constitutional rights. For
instance, physicians have historically clashed with the state over the
provision of medical advice to their patients regarding reproductive rights. 178
Indeed, the dissenting opinions in early Supreme Court cases establishing a
constitutional right to contraception were among the first to raise what we
now refer to as "professional speech" concerns. 179 In those cases, medical
professionals challenged legal restrictions on the dissemination of truthful
information regarding contraceptive devices and services to their patients.
The banned information related specifically to products, devices, and
procedures that affected the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights,
including the right to use contraception and to procure an abortion.
More recently, physicians have been on the front lines in challenges to
state laws prohibiting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and physician-
174. Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,412 (1978) (invalidating state anti-solicitation rule
as applied to an ACLU attorney seeking to represent a woman in a forced sterilization case), with
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding state anti-solicitation rule
as applied to a lawyer who sought to represent clients injured in an auto accident).
175. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (invalidating Virginia law that
restricted solicitation of clients for purposes of challenging racial segregation in public schools).
176. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991) (describing lawyer's press
conference statements as "classic political speech. . . critical of the government and its officials").
177. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (invalidating federal
restrictions on welfare litigation).
178. See Zick, supra note 1, at 7-9 (discussing physician speech and contraceptive rights).
179. See Halberstam, supra note 3, at 835-36 (discussing early cases).
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assisted suicide.180 The laws implicate constitutional rights pertaining to end-
of-life decision-making. Unlike the examples discussed in Part I, state
restrictions in cases affecting death-related rights do not target speech
explicitly. However, these laws can affect the provision of medical advice
regarding end-of-life treatment. They may inhibit conversations about public
policies, or deter actions that could one day alter interpretations of
constitutional rights relating to death.
Lawyers and physicians are not the only licensed professionals whose
communications with clients intersect with or impact constitutional rights.
Marriage counselors, family counselors, social workers, nurses, teachers,
mental health counselors, and child care providers all may find themselves
situated at this critical intersection. Even licensed firearms dealers, who do
not enter the same kind of professional relationship as other licensed entities
or persons, may be subject to future laws implicating their customers'
constitutional rights. '81
In sum, licensed professionals are not infrequently involved in
vindicating, facilitating, or mediating the constitutional rights of their clients
and patients. If the state can regulate professional speech pursuant to its
power to license, it may have a significant impact on communications relating
to the exercise and enjoyment of constitutional rights, and perhaps even the
actual exercise and enjoyment of those rights. As the next Section argues,
state regulation at the intersection of professional rights speech and
constitutional rights poses unique dangers to both expressive and non-
expressive rights.
C. Licensing Professional Rights Speech
Legal commentators have observed that professional speech is not always
or solely concerned with the provision of private advice on matters of
personal concern.'82 Even during seemingly routine, one-to-one interactions
in a professional's office, professional speech can relate to matters of public
concern that are within the coverage and protection of the Free Speech
Clause.
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-28 (1997) (refusing to recognize a
fundamental right to suicide, or the assistance of a physician in committing suicide); Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-85 (1990) (recognizing liberty interest of competent
person to refuse life-sustaining nutrition and hydration).
181. See Zick, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing a hypothetical compulsory arms dealer
disclosure law).
182. See discussion infra Section III.C.
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The degree to which this connection exists varies with the nature of the
professional-client consultation. Clients sometimes seek out professionals for
the specific purpose of discussing constitutional and other legal rights. They
may also discuss problems, procedures, or practices that directly or indirectly
relate to, or concern, the exercise of constitutional rights. Thus, state
regulation of professional communications may preclude or compel
conversations that relate to constitutional rights. The first kind of interaction,
where a client seeks advice relating to these and other rights, is most
commonly associated with legal professionals. The examples discussed in
this Article tend to fall into the other two, more general, categories of
constitutional discourse.
Regarding the examples discussed in this Article, labeling professional
advice and other communications "private" versus "public" fails to capture
the essence of the professional-client interaction. This is also true of the
notion, articulated by some courts, that there is a "spectrum" of professional
speech that includes, at one end, one-to-one speech about private client
concerns, and at the other end public statements by professionals about
matters of public concern.'83 In Wolschlaeger III, which upheld Florida's
firearms privacy law, the court concluded that when a physician "speaks to a
patient in furtherance of the practice of medicine" within the confines of the
physician-patient relationship, the communication is "professional speech"
and not fully protected under the First Amendment. 1
8 4
These approaches are substantially under-inclusive, in particular where
professional rights speech is concerned. In some instances, professionals and
clients are engaged in a form of constitutional discourse. Some of the one-to-
one speech that occurs in professional offices relates directly or indirectly to
the character or exercise of constitutional and legal rights. Matters of critical
public concern, such as the exercise of constitutional rights and their
appropriate scope, also occur in examining rooms and professional offices.
This is not the primary purpose of such locations or interactions, to be sure,
but it can be part of the flow of information between professional and client.
Again, this is easiest to imagine in the case of attorney-client interactions.
Whether a legal professional advises her clients regarding civil rights lawsuits
against the government in a public gymnasium, or does so within the four
183. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1218
(1 1h Cir. 2014) (contending that a professional's speech rights "approach a nadir... when the
professional speaks privately, in the course of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a
person receiving the professional's services[,]" but reach their apex when the professional
engages in public speech).
184. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 111), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *20-21 (1 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015).
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walls of her downtown office, surely does not dictate whether the First
Amendment is implicated in the exchange. Indeed, if the public-private
distinction did the work some courts have ascribed to it in professional
settings, a lawyer writing a brief at his desk might be engaged in wholly
uncovered and unprotected private speech, while a lawyer filing that same
brief in court would presumably be engaged in covered and protected public
speech (assuming the filing itself is not considered conduct, rather than
speech).185
Recent professional speech regulations, including those discussed in Part
I, help us to understand that it is not the location or even the character of the
interaction that is critical but rather the professional function that is affected
by communication-specific mandates. Professionals are not just expert
automatons who dispense technical advice, medicines, and cold facts. They
engage with clients and patients on a variety of subjects, including matters
relating to their constitutional and legal interests. This is not to suggest that
lawyer and client, or doctor and patient, are engaged in seminar-like
discussions of constitutional principles. However, they do engage in
dialogues that touch on, concern, or implicate constitutional and legal rights.
Allowing the state, through its licensing authority, to regulate all aspects of
professional-client relationships so long as they take the form of "direct,
personalized speech with clients"18 6 threatens a substantial amount of
expression that relates to patients' and clients' constitutional and legal rights.
Moreover, treating all professional speech and activities as mere conduct,
or as subject to any reasonable state regulations as part of a course of conduct
(as some courts have concluded), undermines the distinctive constitutional
functions of some professional expression. 87 Under this approach, even a
lawyer's questions, legal filings, or other communications on behalf of clients
would constitute a course of conduct or representation not covered by the
Free Speech Clause. But surely the state cannot prohibit lawyers from
interviewing their clients about constitutional violations, or ban them from
filing certain specified constitutional or legal claims. 88 Nor, presumably, can
the state compel lawyers to communicate specific scripts of information to
their clients about the burdens associated with filing civil rights lawsuits, or
the possible negative effects such litigation may produce. Such regulations
185. See discussion infra Section II1.A.
186. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
187. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1224
(11 th Cir. 2014) (observing that "[a] physician's inquiry about the presence of firearms in a
patient's home may be viewed as the opening salvo in an attempt to treat any issues raised by the
presence of those firearms").
188. Cf Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536-37 (2001) (invalidating a
spending condition that prohibited fund recipients from filing challenges to federal welfare laws).
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would undermine the independence of legal professionals. Indeed, it would
effectively render them agents of the state. Such regulations would so
fundamentally alter the functioning of the legal profession that courts would
almost certainly invalidate them on First Amendment grounds.
Again, although the legal profession highlights the constitutional and free
speech concerns, they extend to other professional-client communications.
Under the approach to professional speech adopted by some lower courts,
legislatures would have broad authority to restrict or structure conversations
relating to a wide variety of constitutional rights.'89 Consider the following
examples, only some of which are hypothetical:
* A law prohibiting licensed marriage counselors from advising
clients not to enter interracial marriages. 90
* A law banning licensed family counselors from advising clients
that interracial adoption may not be in the best interests of the
child. 19'
* A law barring physicians from discussing the availability of
abortion, or the pros and cons of procuring an abortion, with their
patients.
* A law prohibiting physicians or psychotherapists from engaging in
certain kinds of treatments relating to gender dysphoria.
* A law compelling physicians to inform their clients that certain
abortion procedures can be "reversed."' 92
" A law prohibiting physicians from expressing the view that
marijuana use is medically beneficial for some patients, and thus
ought to be protected under state or federal constitutional law. 193
* A law barring lawyers from discussing the safety and legal
implications of the purchase and possession of firearms for clients'
self-defense.
189. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), No. 12-14009, 2015
WL 8639875, at *20 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (adopting a distinction between speech by a
professional to an individual client and professional communications uttered "to a crowd at a
rally").
190. See Eugene Volokh, Speech As Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances, " and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1277, 1344 (2005) (discussing example).
191. Id. (discussing example).
192. Arkansas and Arizona have recently enacted such laws. See Sandhya Somashekhar, In
Arizona, Arkansas, Women Must be Told That Abortion can be 'Reversed', WASH. POST, (Apr. 7,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/04/07/arizona-arkansas-tell-
women-drug-induced-abortion-can-be-reversed.
193. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (invalidating portion of policy
that prohibited physicians from recommending marijuana to their patients).
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" A law prohibiting physicians from asking patients any questions
relating to their end-of-life plans.
" A law compelling physicians to present specific information to
patients for the purpose of persuading them not to refuse life-
sustaining nutrition or hydration (a right the Court has assumed
competent adults possess). 94
Under the view, expressed by Justice White in his Lowe concurrence and
adopted by some lower courts, that the state can regulate professional speech
any time a professional is "exercis[ing] judgment on behalf of the client in
the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances,"' 9 these laws
might all be considered valid regulations. None would necessarily be subject
to any meaningful First Amendment scrutiny, despite the obvious fact that
each restricts, based on subject matter or viewpoint, a conversation about or
concerning a specific or general constitutional right.196
In some of the above examples, marriage counselors, physicians, lawyers,
and others would be barred from engaging in a dialogue with their clients that
touches on rights to marriage, abortion, marijuana use, contraception, gender
identity, and the right to bear arms. Yet under the view adopted by some
courts, all of these conversations would be considered discourse on "private"
matters within the confines of a professional-client relationship. Questions or
statements regarding the recognition or exercise of constitutional rights could
readily be cast, as one court put it, as "opening salvo[s]" in the course of
professional treatment or representation. 191
To be sure, one might argue that some of the laws described above relate
not to the exercise of professional judgment "tailored to the patient's
individual circumstances," but rather to the professionals' opinions on
matters outside or beyond the scope of the professional relationship. 98 Thus,
the laws might be deemed on that basis to reside beyond the state's licensing
and regulatory powers. However, there are a number of problems with this
argument.
First, as already discussed, it ignores the constitutional functions
professionals perform on behalf of clients and patients, as well as the
sometimes close connection between professional advice and the exercise of
constitutional rights. Separating professional opinions about rights from
194. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-85 (1990) (recognizing a
due process liberty interest of competent person to refuse life-sustaining nutrition and hydration).
195. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
196. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that regulations that "appl[y] to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed" are subject to strict scrutiny).
197. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1224 (11 th Cir.
2014).
198. Id. at 1221.
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professional advice regarding their effective exercise is not a simple matter.
Second, the response seems to abandon the private office/public forum
distinction, which in its extreme form posits that all communications that
occur within the examination room or office are subject to state regulation
with minimal or no First Amendment scrutiny. As the Eleventh Circuit
opined in its first opinion upholding Florida's firearms law, "the privacy of a
physician's examination room is not an appropriate forum for unrestricted
debate on [public] matters."'99 Third, and relatedly, providing free speech
protection for at least some professional rights speech would require that
courts acknowledge it is sometimes "appropriate" for professionals and
clients to discuss matters of public concern in examining rooms, conference
rooms, and professional offices. Fourth, the argument is inconsistent with the
"opening salvo" principle, under which regulated or compelled statements
are treated as a mere prelude to a course of treatment or representation within
the regulated course of conduct.200
As the examples and discussion suggest, the state could not only prohibit
but also compel statements relating to or concerning constitutional rights. For
example, legislatures could require marriage counselors to extol the benefits
of interracial marriage. Laws could compel physicians to condemn the right
to possess and use marijuana, or present the state's views regarding the
sanctity of life in connection with end-of-life decisions, or restrict discussions
that might lead to gender-reassignment. The state could compel physicians to
discuss certain forms of contraception with their patients, or require
physicians to persuade women to obtain abortions. Insofar as state power is
concerned, under the most permissive readings of precedents such as Casey
and Lowe, these laws would at least stand a reasonable chance of
withstanding free speech challenges by professionals and patients.
To be sure, at least one prominent free speech commentator's intuition
tells him that some of the above laws implicate and perhaps even violate the
First Amendment.20 However, until a legislature passes such a law and a
court reviews it, we will not know for certain. The unfinished doctrine of
professional speech leaves plenty of room for argument. Some of the
hypothetical laws in this discussion may seem rather fanciful or farfetched.
Then again, not too long ago, a hypothetical law prohibiting primary care
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1224.
201. See Volokh, supra note 190, at 1344 ("I'm fairly certain that doctors at least have the
constitutional right to inform their patients of the medical benefits of marijuana, and to urge the
patients to lobby their legislators to enact a medical marijuana exception .... Likewise, I doubt
that it would be constitutional for the government to ... ban [] counselors from advocating (or
condemning) interracial marriages or adoptions.").
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physicians from asking their patients questions about firearms possession in
the home might have warranted the same skeptical reaction. We need not
resort to hypothetical enactments. Recent laws regulating professional speech
concerning Second Amendment rights, abortion, and equality raise serious
free speech concerns.
Viewing these regulations as restricting professional rights speech
supports the intuition that such laws implicate, and indeed may violate, the
Free Speech Clause. Recognizing that some professional speech regulations
affect constitutional and other legal rights complicates the lines courts have
been drawing between speech and conduct, and between public and private
speech. Recent professional speech regulations have highlighted another
dimension of the state's power to license and regulate professionals. In that
dimension, professional regulations implicate patients' rights to learn about
constitutional rights and professionals' ability to convey information relating
to those rights.
D. Constitutional Discourse: Arms, Abortion, and Equality
As I have argued elsewhere, when speech restrictions concern or touch
upon the subject of constitutional rights, heightened First Amendment
scrutiny is justified for two general reasons.0 2 First, governmental efforts to
regulate or structure professional-client conversations relating to individual
rights implicate core free speech concerns. 203 They are, and ought to be
treated as, efforts to regulate political speech.20 4 Indeed, as the examples in
Part I demonstrate, in many cases they are content-based regulations of
political speech.
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
regulations that target or compel speech based on its subject matter or
viewpoint are subject to strict scrutiny.2°5 In Reed, a town had subjected
directional, political, and other signs to different standards based on their
content.206 The Court held that the signage ordinance was content-based
because the standard to be applied to any sign "depend[ed] entirely on the
communicative content of the sign. 207
202. See Zick, supra note 1, at 41-55.
203. See id. at 44-50 (discussing expressive values harmed by rights speech regulations).
204. See id. at 4 (arguing that rights speech "goes to the heart of democratic self-governance
in the sense that it implicates the content and scope of limits on state power").
205. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
206. Id. at 2224-25.
207. Id. at 2227.
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The holding and rationale of Reed strongly suggest that the laws discussed
in Part I are content-based and ought to be treated as such. The laws under
consideration restrict or compel the dissemination of information about
matters of public concern, including firearms, abortion, marriage, and
contraception. They restrict the dissemination of information, or compel its
disclosure, in part of the political speech marketplace. Like the broader
category of rights speech, professional rights speech is deserving of the
highest level of First Amendment protection. When states suppress, dictate,
or compel communications based on their content, their laws are subject to
strict scrutiny. If this is true with regard to directional and other temporary
signs, it surely must also be true with regard to content relating to substantive
rights. As the discussion in the preceding Section and in Part III show, the
fact that the speakers and audiences are professionals and their clients does
not permit the state to evade heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
Second, rights speech regulations also implicate non-expressive
constitutional rights.208 In some cases, most clearly in the abortion context,
they can effectively undermine or interfere with the exercise of constitutional
rights.209 Regulations of rights speech can also be used by the state to favor
or diminish constitutional rights.21 0 By regulating private speech, in this case
professional-client communications, the state can effectively favor or
disfavor certain rights over others. The state can engage in governmental
rights speech and propound its own views with respect to constitutional
rights. However, it is not allowed to diminish or disfavor constitutional rights
through the regulation of private expression.21
Professional rights speech regulations raise democratic process concerns.
Although they may present as regulations of professional conduct or
treatment, they operate as restrictions on the private exercise of expressive or
non-expressive constitutional rights. Even where, as in the arms context, the
state purports to be protecting Second Amendment rights, it is doing so in a
way that places a regulatory thumb on the scale of the non-expressive right.
2 12
The state may achieve added protection for the right to bear arms, but it does
so at the expense of the free flow of information. In this context, as in others,
the Free Speech Clause ensures that the flow of information about rights is
208. See Zick, supra note 1, at 52-55 (discussing non-expressive harms caused by rights
speech regulations).
209. Id. at 52.
210. Id. at 53-54 (discussing de facto ranking of rights by the state, rather than by the people).
211. See id. (discussing harms to the democratic process caused by some rights speech
regulations).
212. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 111), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *27 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (balancing free speech rights of physicians and patients
against Second Amendment right to bear arms and privacy with respect to arms possession).
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uninhibited and robust. It precludes the state from imposing its own view of
constitutional rights under the guise of exercising regulatory authority with
regard to professional services.
Let us return briefly to the examples discussed in Part I, in order to
consider the expressive and non-expressive harms associated with
professional rights speech regulations. Commentators have focused on
concerns such as the dissemination of expert knowledge, patients' access to
information, or the interests of professional knowledge communities. 21 3
These are important concerns. However, as noted, states are regulating not
merely the dissemination of clinical advice and medical treatments, but
important dialogue about or concerning constitutional rights. In this sense,
professional rights speech regulations are a far cry from typical licensing
requirements. Regulations that forbid, alter, or compel communications
relating to constitutional rights raise a distinctive set of constitutional
concerns.
Florida's firearms privacy law expressly forbids specific inquiries on
identified topics that the state claims relate solely to the practice of medicine.
However, the purpose of the detailed proscriptions on physician inquiries,
record-keeping, and harassment is to prevent doctors from engaging in what
some legislators-and, apparently, the NRA-believed to be politically
charged attacks on patients' Second Amendment rights.' 4 In essence, the
state disagreed with the content of physicians' inquiries about firearms,
thought such inquiries might be working to dissuade at least some patients
from having firearms in their homes, and acted to censor professional
communications regarding firearms possession.215
The First Amendment does not permit the state to suppress information on
the ground that it might be "too persuasive. '216 This is true whether the speech
is delivered on a street corner or in a physician's office. The underlying
subject matter of the Florida inquiry ban relates to the exercise of a
constitutional right. That the law regulates communications on a matter of
important public concern is reason enough to subject it to skeptical First
Amendment review. However, the law suffers from an additional infirmity.
213. See generally Haupt, supra note 3 (focusing on expertise of "knowledge communities");
POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3 (focusing on transmission of information from expert to
client).
214. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 11), 797 F.3d 859, 901-02 (11 th
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J. dissenting) (describing the legislative history that led to the Florida Act).
215. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 111), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *25 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) ("The Act protects the right to keep and bear arms by
protecting patients from irrelevant questionsing about guns that could dissuade them from
exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights").
216. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
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As noted, it seeks to impose the state's views regarding the Second
Amendment and firearms possession, through a form of professional
censorship. Thus, it is both subject-matter and viewpoint-discriminatory.
Such laws merit the strict scrutiny reserved for laws that single out political
expression.2 17
Florida defended the law, in part, as a regulation of professional practices.
However, as the Eleventh Circuit's third opinion on the law made clear, what
it actually regulates is a conversation relating to the right to bear arms. In
upholding the law, the court relied heavily on Florida's interest in ensuring
that the exercise of Second Amendment rights was not chilled by physician
inquiries about arms possession or statements about the safety of having arms
in the home.2"8 Viewed in this light, the Florida Act regulates a topic of
important public concern - firearms safety.219 It also seeks to protect the
state's own viewpoint regarding the importance or sanctity of the right to bear
arms. Note that doctors and patients are not engaged in some deep political
discourse regarding Second Amendment rights during patient intake
questioning or other aspects of the examination. They well could be, and the
state ought not to interfere with such conversations if and when they occur.
However, even assuming the questioning is merely routine, it relates to the
safety implications of possessing firearms in one's home.
When states regulate speech on a matter of such clear and critical public
concern, their laws ought to be subject to strict scrutiny. Government
regulation of a conversation between one person and another that relates to a
constitutional right are inherently suspect. The fact that a patient might be
convinced, even as a result of routine inquiries by a physician, to refrain from
exercising Second Amendment rights or to exercise them with greater care is
a justification for protecting, rather than suppressing, the inquiry. The patient
may hear and consider the inquiry, but not consider it relevant or important
enough to merit any change in behavior. The decision is the patient's, and
neither the state nor physicians ought to engage in coercive measures to
override the choice. However, whatever the decision, it ought to be based on
all available information-including information disseminated by
professionals, who certainly occupy a position that allows them to provide
217. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (subjecting state law prohibiting
offensive flag-burning to strict scrutiny).
218. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger Il), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *24-25 (1 1th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (discussing Florida's "compelling" interests in
protecting Second Amendment rights and privacy with regard to arms possession).
219. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (recognizing Second Amendment right to
bear arms). See also Zick, supra note 1, at 38 ("[D]iscourse regarding Second Amendment rights
now focuses primarily on the scope of the right and, in particular, the extent to which its exercise
can or ought to be restricted.").
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information regarding the safety implications of exercising Second
Amendment rights.22 °
From this perspective, it is not the state's interference with a "bounded
institution," or the legislature's lack of respect for the conclusions of a
particular "knowledge community," that makes the Florida law or others
suspect under the First Amendment. 2 1 As I argue in Part III, these
considerations provide some justification for skeptical review of professional
speech regulations.222 However, professional rights speech regulations are
troubling for different reasons. In essence, states are claiming the authority to
restrict communications regarding fundamental constitutional rights as an
incident to licensure. As I have argued, the logic of this position is that
government could prohibit (or compel) almost any speech by a licensed
professional that relates to a constitutional right.
Thus, Florida's interference with professional-client discourse about or
concerning the exercise of a constitutional right merited the strict scrutiny the
Eleventh Circuit ultimately gave it, rather than the rationality review of its
first opinion. What is missing from the court's opinions is any recognition
that the reason strict scrutiny is appropriate relates to the special content of
the conversation Florida regulated. Even though the communication takes
place in the context of the physician-patient relationship and relates to
medical care, it concerns a matter of pressing concern with regard to public
safety. It is not just the physician's right to ask the question that is at stake;
patients too have a First Amendment interest in the conversation. As Robert
Post has suggested, access to expert knowledge can empower individuals to
engage in meaningful public discourse.223 Specifically, access to professional
knowledge can enable individuals to participate in the formation of public
opinion-participation that Post argues is necessary for effective self-
government.224 Access to professional knowledge that relates to the exercise
of constitutional rights, including the right to bear arms, is critically important
in all of these respects.
For similar reasons, laws compelling physicians to disclose detailed,
content-specific information regarding abortion, or to present ideological
messages to patients, likewise ought to be treated as suspect under the First
220. Cf Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) ("Teachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds
allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be
able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.").
221. See generally Halberstam, supra note 3; Haupt, supra note 3.
222. See infra Section III.D.
223. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 33-34.
224. Id. at 46.
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Amendment. 2 5 Unlike compelled disclosures relating to breast cancer
surgery or certain dangerous medical procedures, compulsory abortion
disclosures specifically address the subject matter of a constitutionally
protected activity.
226
To be sure, compulsory abortion disclosure laws do not purport to
explicitly regulate intellectual or political discourse regarding abortion rights.
However, by prescribing the content of what physicians must say about the
procedure and its effects, they regulate abortion communications between
physicians and their female patients. Like the Florida firearms law,
compulsory disclosure laws relate to and can potentially affect the decision
whether or not to exercise a constitutional right. Thus, the compelled content
may influence patients' opinions regarding the constitutional right to
abortion-indeed, that appears to be the point of many compulsory abortion
speech laws.
What patients learn in the examining room may also affect discussions
about abortion at home, at work, and in other contexts. Thus, it is not merely
that the laws compel physician speech that matters to patients in terms of their
specific course of treatment. The effects of compulsion on public discourse
must also be considered.227
Of course, states may legitimately compel disclosure of the risks of
medical procedures - including abortion. Sometimes they may do so in an
effort to dissuade patients from accepting risks the state deems to be
unreasonable, as where certain procedures have proven to have high mortality
rates. However, persuading patients not to exercise a constitutional right
through the mechanism of compelled disclosure is a fundamentally different
matter. Laws of this nature, which intersect closely with constitutional rights,
regulate an important part of the broader social discourse regarding rights.
They raise the specter that the state will smuggle its political views regarding
the exercise of constitutional rights into the examining room. The state's
intervention occurs at a point where it is critical that factual and other
information regarding the right be disseminated, and in a place where a
constitutional right likely will or will not be imminently exercised.
The free speech problems with compulsory disclosure laws extend beyond
the abortion right example. As discussed, under current approaches to
225. For a general discussion of compelled abortion disclosures and their free speech
implications, see Corbin, supra note 3.
226. See David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 9 (2015) (discussing state disclosure requirements relating to electroconvulsive treatment
and other medical procedures).
227. See Zick, supra note 1, at 47-48 (arguing that "laws that compel physicians to
communicate detailed information to their patients about abortion's negative effects can seriously
distort abortion rights discourse").
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professional speech, states would be allowed to compel disclosures regarding
a variety of legal and constitutional rights. A law that compelled physicians
to discuss contraception with their female patients, toward the end of
persuading them to use a particular method thought by the government to be
particularly effective, would raise similar concerns. Whether the state seeks
to encourage or discourage exercise of the right in question, its intervention
in this sphere raises First Amendment and other constitutional concerns.
It is particularly important that meaningful First Amendment scrutiny be
applied to these professional-client interactions. The Due Process Clause
protects substantive reproductive rights. When the state seeks to compel
private speech and persuade patients not to exercise a constitutional right, the
First Amendment serves a separate but related function. It ensures that
information relating to reproductive rights flows freely, and that the state
cannot use professionals to skew conversations regarding exercise of
constitutional rights. 228 Thus, in the abortion context, the Due Process
Clause's "undue burden" standard ensures that women remain physically and
psychologically free to exercise a constitutional choice. The First
Amendment free speech limitation ensures that women have all medically
necessary information to make the choice, and prevents the state from using
the examining room as a forum for its own ideological expression.
Government can certainly require that medically relevant information
regarding abortion and other medical procedures be conveyed to patients. The
state may even provide that information in the belief that it will persuade a
woman not to procure an abortion. However, when it engages in an
ideological assault on the constitutional right to abortion, or any other
constitutional right, the state is no longer simply ensuring that women's
informed consent is obtained. Contrary to the cryptic analysis of free speech
in Casey, The First Amendment is not merely "implicated" 229 when states
pass ideological abortion disclosure laws; it is threatened in unique ways. As
the Fourth Circuit recently observed when it invalidated a compelled abortion
speech law: "Though states may surely enact legislation to ensure that a
woman's choice is informed and thoughtful when she elects to have an
abortion, states cannot so compromise physicians' free speech rights,
professional judgment, patient autonomy, and other important state interests
in the process. '"230
228. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1293 ("[T]he free flow of information that results when
speech is protected ensures people have access to the full range of ideas and information for their
political and personal decision making.").
229. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992).
230. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
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I have saved the discussion of SOCE therapy bans for last, in part because
it may be most difficult to justify First Amendment scrutiny for such laws.
Some courts have treated SOCE therapy as a form of professional conduct,
indistinguishable from prescribing a drug or performing a surgery."' If they
are indeed the functional equivalent of an unlawful prescription, SOCE bans
do not implicate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. However, as
discussed in more detail below, it is difficult to justify the conclusion that
specified talk therapies, which are arguably barred by the state owing at least
in part to their content (i.e., what they convey to or about minor homosexuals)
lie entirely beyond the First Amendment's reach.232
Even assuming that they are within the First Amendment's coverage,
however, some might have difficulty viewing psychotherapists as
constitutional intermediaries in this particular context. After all, in contrast
to lawyers and even some physicians, psychotherapists' speech would seem
to have little to do with informing patients about constitutional rights or
enhancing their ability to participate in any sort of public opinion-making.
However, in certain respects, SOCE therapy bans function similarly to
firearms inquiry bans and compulsory abortion disclosures. On one view,
SOCE bans are efforts by states to use their licensing power to reject and
suppress an old form of sexual orientation bigotry. The notion that
homosexuality is a disease or sickness has a long and troubled connection to
the oppression of gay men and lesbians. 233 Through SOCE bans, states reject
this idea as discredited (at least as to minor patients); they effectively ban its
promulgation in the context of professional therapy sessions. Viewed from
this perspective, SOCE bans constitute state intervention in the debate about
the nature of homosexuality-an issue at the heart of both historical and
contemporary debates concerning gay equality.
The state is free to counteract and reject anti-gay bigotry in many ways. It
may, for example, pass legal employment and other anti-discrimination
protections to benefit gay persons. It may provide for marriage equality. It
may also express its disapproval of anti-gay ideologies in non-coercive ways,
such as through its own speech or through education programs.234
231. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013).
232. See discussion infra Section lI.A.
233. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation ofAntigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1331 (2000) (noting that
anti-gay discourse has changed over the decades, "with social republican arguments superseding
medical arguments, which earlier had superseded natural law arguments").
234. See generally COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT
SAY? How DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012) (arguing
that governments should engage in non-coercive persuasion to convince citizens to adopt liberal
positions regarding gay equality and other rights).
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However, when the state uses its power over professionals to restrict the
provision of expert advice and treatment that directly or indirectly relates to
constitutional equality, its regulatory power implicates important free speech
concerns. As stated, the Free Speech Clause requires that the state justify any
restrictions on ideas or viewpoints contrary to its own under a strict scrutiny
standard. The fact that the restrictions in this context take the form of bans on
purportedly harmful therapies does not alter this basic principle, or eliminate
the need for First Amendment scrutiny of SOCE bans. When the state seeks
to influence professional-client interactions that implicate the basis for,
recognition of, or exercise of constitutional rights, the First Amendment is
clearly implicated.
This is a minority view, insofar as courts and professional speech
commentators are concerned. For example, Claudia Haupt's approach would
appear to permit SOCE bans without First Amendment scrutiny, so long as
they are consistent with the expert views of the "knowledge community." '235
Robert Post's theory of democratic competence appears to reach a similar
conclusion, for largely similar reasons.236 Under a professional rights speech
approach, by contrast, the state of expert knowledge regarding the harms
associated with SOCE therapies is part of the First Amendment calculus. The
state may defend its ban based on those harms. However, it cannot simply
decree that talk therapies or other professional communications lie beyond
the First Amendment's coverage. It must defend them against free speech
challenges, just as Florida must defend its inquiry ban.
In the case of SOCE bans, states appear to have plausible defenses to First
Amendment claims. If the therapy is indeed harmful to minor patients, then
there is a compelling interest in regulating or even proscribing it. So, too, if
the practice is fraudulent, a jury can make that finding under generally
applicable consumer protection laws-fraud is not covered by the Free
Speech Clause. 237 Further, if the state leaves open channels in which
psychotherapists may discuss the merits of SOCE, its appropriateness for
some patients, and the therapy's purportedly beneficial effects, then the law
may be narrowly tailored to serve the state's interests. What is critical is that
these analytical steps be taken, and that meaningful judicial review of
professional speech restrictions like SOCE bans take place.
235. See Haupt, supra note 3, at 50-51 (discussing SOCE bans).
236. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 56-58 (discussing state of the art with regard
to expert knowledge).
237. A jury in New Jersey recently found that a religious group that promised clients it could
change their sexual orientation committed fraudulent business practices. See Olga Khazan, The
End of Gay Conversion Therapy, THE ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/the-end-of-gay-conversion-therapy/396953/.
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III. PROFESSIONAL-CLIENT SPEECH: PRINCIPLES, PRESERVATION, AND
POLITICS
Part II contended that professional rights speech regulations merit
heightened (strict) First Amendment scrutiny for a variety of reasons,
including their effect on the constitutional functions served by professionals
and the constitutional harms that are associated with regulation of speech
about or concerning constitutional rights. One general answer to the
arguments in Part II, and indeed the argument relied on by states in defending
the professional speech regulations discussed in this Article, is that the
ordinary free speech rules simply do not apply to professional-client
communications. Owing to the state's licensing authority, this argument
maintains, the First Amendment is either not implicated at all or is only
minimally implicated. Under this reasoning, professional speech is
considered unique because it is mere conduct, involves the flow of private
rather than public information, and does not implicate core free speech
concerns such as self-government or the search for truth. Part II is a general
response to some of these contentions. This Part answers them more directly,
and in more specific terms. It questions each of the allegedly distinctive
aspects of professional speech and professional speech regulations. In brief,
it argues that the mere fact that the parties to the regulated communications
are professionals and their clients does not eradicate First Amendment free
speech coverage or protection. Although they are extraordinary in certain
respects, the examples discussed in Part I help to demonstrate why state
licensure of professional-client communications ought generally to be
viewed with greater skepticism by courts and scholars.
A. Professional Speech and Professional Conduct
The matter of "professional speech," or communications between licensed
professionals and clients/patients, could be categorically disposed of by
concluding, as some courts have, that all professional activities-including
those with communicative elements-are forms of conduct and thus not
covered (or only minimally covered) by the First Amendment.238 Note that
this conclusion would extend not only to things such as writing prescriptions
and filing briefs, but also to the provision of expert advice. Under this view,
regulation of any and all communications by professionals to their clients-
238. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaegerl), 760 F.3d 1195, 1217-25
(11 th Cir. 2014) (relying on the speech/conduct distinction to conclude that firearms inquiry ban
did not merit strict scrutiny under First Amendment); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th
Cir. 2013) (concluding that SOCE therapy ban. regulated conduct, not speech).
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or, at least, any that occur within the office setting-would be considered
merely "incidental to the conduct of the profession"23 9 and would raise no
First Amendment concerns.
In contrast to some courts, professional speech scholars have generally
rejected this supposed professional speech-professional conduct
distinction.2 40 However, for the most part, they have not given the speech-
conduct distinction adequate consideration.24 ' If recent professional speech
regulations-and judicial dispositions upholding them-are indicative of
future First Amendment analysis, this issue demands more serious attention.
The distinction between speech and conduct has engaged and, indeed,
confounded courts and First Amendment scholars for decades. 42 The deep
mysteries and conundrums related to this distinction cannot be resolved here.
Rather, the discussion will focus on current doctrines and precedents rather
than theoretical arguments such as, for example, there is in fact no defensible
distinction between speech and conduct. In other words, the discussion will
engage courts where and how they actually decide such matters-in the arena
of precedents and principles.
There are a number of reasons to reject the "everything is conduct"
interpretation. First, to parse snippets from the incomplete doctrine of
professional speech, the words "incidental to the conduct of the profession"
are Justice White's, from his Lowe concurrence.2 43 Justice White's
concurrence did not embrace the notion that all restrictions on professional
communications are regulations of conduct beyond the Free Speech Clause's
coverage. Indeed, in the very next sentence, Justice White provided this
239. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
240. See, e.g., POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 50 (asserting that professional advice
given by lawyer to client in a private setting is covered by the Free Speech Clause); Halberstam,
supra note 3, at 840-41 (equating professional speech and professional advice); Haupt, supra
note 3, at 49 (asserting that "'talk therapy' is speech"); Kry, supra note 3, at 896 (arguing that
regulation of professional advice is not regulation of conduct); see also Volokh, supra note 190,
at 1343 ("Most of what many lawyers, investment advisors, accountants, psychotherapists, and
even doctors do is speech.").
241. An exception is Kry, supra note 3, at 892-97 (offering detailed arguments regarding
why regulation of professional advice is not the regulation of conduct).
242. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970) (arguing that while expression could not be controlled by
government, conduct usually can be restricted); Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968) ("A constitutional distinction between speech and conduct is
specious. Speech is conduct, and actions speak."); see also Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction
Between Speech and Action (Jan. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(arguing that a distinction between speech and action/conduct may not be defensible).
243. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring).
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example: "If the government enacts generally applicable licensing provisions
limiting the class of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be
said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the press subject to
First Amendment scrutiny."244
Recent restrictions on professional-client communications do not imitate
this example. However one characterizes them, the inquiry restrictions,
therapy bans, and compulsory disclosure requirements discussed in Parts I
and II are not "generally applicable" professional access limitations. Rather,
they are direct and specific limitations on, or requirements for, professional-
client communications. State officials, and some courts, have inappropriately
relied on the "incidental to the conduct of the profession" language in the
Lowe concurrence. That language does not justify the extraordinary
restrictions enacted by Florida, California, New Jersey, and other states. 245
Second, the "all professional speech is conduct" position is inconsistent
with a number of Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Lowe, which have
rejected similar arguments in professional settings.246 Thus, Casey explicitly
states that "the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated' when the state requires abortion disclosures.247 Similarly, Rust
strongly suggests that the state is not at liberty to dictate detailed scripts to
physicians-even where it funds the project in which the communications
takes place.2 48 Velazquez also applies free speech limitations to Congress's
funding restrictions, in that case as applied to lawyers representing clients in
constitutional and legal challenges to federal welfare laws.2 49 Perhaps most
notably, in Humanitarian Law Project, the Court explicitly rejected the
government's argument that rendering professional advice and assistance-
including professional legal advice-to foreign terrorist organizations
constituted conduct as opposed to covered speech.5 0
These and other precedents cannot be squared with the notion that medical
professionals' oral inquiries, talk therapies, and physician disclosures are all
instances of pure conduct entirely beyond the First Amendment's coverage.
244. Id.
245. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger ll), 797 F.3d 895, 911 (11lth Cir.
2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("Thus, Lowe established only that the existence of a professional
relationship is a necessary condition" for evading First Amendment scrutiny, not "that such a
condition was sufficient to support this conclusion.").
246. See supra, notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
247. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992) (emphasis added).
248. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-96 (1991).
249. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-49 (2001).
250. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2010). The Court has rejected
the speech-conduct argument in other recent cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-95
(2010) (holding that the act of signing a referendum petition is "speech" within the First
Amendment's coverage).
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To conclude that these activities are all instances of "conduct," simply by
virtue of state licensure of the practices of medicine or psychotherapy, would
mean that the granting of a license transforms all professional advice into a
continuous "course of conduct" beyond the First Amendment's domain.25
Nothing that Justice White or the Court have written or held can be
interpreted to support that extraordinary proposition, which would effectively
extinguish all First Amendment protections for licensed professionals.
Still, drawing some distinction between speech and conduct is obviously
necessary in the context of professional-client interactions. Otherwise,
activities such as writing a drug prescription or making notations on a
patient's chart would qualify as "speech" subject to First Amendment
coverage and perhaps even protection. The law of malpractice, which
regulates such activities, is a paradigmatic example of a type of generally
applicable regulation that is, in Justice White's words, "incidental to the
conduct of the profession." This is why physicians cannot invoke the First
Amendment as protection against claims that they breached the applicable
standard of patient care relating to prescribing medicines or treating patients'
conditions. 2
It does not follow, however, that states may evade First Amendment
scrutiny when they enact regulations establishing a professional standard of
care that restricts specific inquiries about matters of public concern, bans
targeted therapies that undermine sexual orientation equality, or compels
particular abortion disclosures. The concern that malpractice and other
standards might be vulnerable to free speech challenges likely accounts, to
some degree, for the positive reception the "everything is conduct" argument
has received in some recent cases. However, the argument confuses
application of general standards of professional care, which can indirectly
regulate speech, with the sort of direct and content-based regulations of
professional-client communications described in Part 1.
Malpractice liability indirectly affects professionals' ability to
communicate certain information to clients, or punishes the failure to
communicate information required by the applicable standard of care. While
malpractice liability ultimately rests to some degree on communicative
251. Nor are laws like Florida's firearms inquiry ban regulations of "symbolic conduct," as
the Eleventh Circuit held. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), No. 12-
14009, 2015 WL 8639875, at *19-20 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). Asking patients questions is
clearly a form of pure speech.
252. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 47 ("Malpractice law protects the
vulnerability of clients by requiring professionals to maintain strict standards of expert
knowledge."); Halberstam, supra note 3, at 867 (arguing that state may regulate in order to
"ensure the integrity of the communicative institution"); Haupt, supra note 3, at 36 (arguing that
tort liability for professional malpractice is consistent with freedom of speech).
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content, general standards of care do not forbid specific inquiries or
treatments, or require specific statements, in advance of the formation of a
professional-client relationship. Although states have sometimes required
detailed disclosure requirements for certain risky procedures, laws do not
typically enact scripts, or ban targeted professional inquiries, or eliminate
particular therapies.253
Malpractice laws generally require the trier of fact to assess a course of
care, to determine whether it meets applicable professional standards. By
contrast, inquiry restrictions, therapy bans, and compelled disclosures do not
merely codify general standards of professional care. The regulations are
direct, increasingly detailed, and explicitly content-based state interventions
in the realm of professional-client interactions. Such regulations fit
uncomfortably within a tradition of professional malpractice regulation. They
raise at least the possibility that legislators are prescribing or proscribing
communications, rather than setting standards of conduct or care that are
supported by the relevant professional community.
For example, Florida's Firearms Owners' Privacy Act restricts inquiries
that are supported by the principal medical authorities, and thus purports to
override medical judgment.25 4 SOCE therapy bans are based on still-disputed
empirical evidence (although the evidence that does exist strongly suggests
the therapy is harmful for some patients).255 Compelled abortion disclosures,
which are rooted in state efforts to dissuade abortion, sometimes command
communication of opinions or ideological statements rather than established
medical facts.256 These and similar laws are not run-mine professional course
of treatment regulations. They are content-based restrictions on expression.
There is something unsettling about resting First Amendment coverage
and, ultimately, protection for the very broad category of "professional
speech" on a contested distinction between speech and conduct. This has not
been done for public employee speech, student speech, or any other free
speech framework under which government stands in some special
relationship with the speaker or communication. And for good reason. As
discussed further below, granting the state power to re-define all interactions
253. See Orentlicher, supra note 226, at 9 (discussing state disclosure requirements relating
to electroconvulsive treatment).
254. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1230 (11 th
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (observing that the American Medical Association, among
other authorities, supported collection of firearms ownership information).
255. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 239 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that empirical studies
on the effects of SOCE "fall[] short of the demanding standards imposed by the scientific
community").
256. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1327-29 (discussing the distortion harms associated with
some compelled abortion disclosures).
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and encounters between professionals and clients as conduct, so long as they
occur in the context of the professional-client relationship, threatens
significant free speech, professionalism, and other values.257 These general
concerns are in addition to the specific constitutional concerns already
examined in Part II.
What some federal judges have called the speech-conduct "labeling
game ' 218 can generally be avoided by adopting a general standard that
requires strict First Amendment scrutiny for any direct, content-based
regulation of lawful professional advice. This approach is consistent with
recent Supreme Court precedents. It is also consistent with the treatment of
general malpractice and other professional standard of care obligations,
which as noted have not generally been thought to raise any First Amendment
concerns. Under this standard, state licensure and registration, professional
access limits, and general standard of care requirements would all remain
beyond the First Amendment's coverage. However, when the state ventures
beyond these traditional boundaries, it enters an area in which it must respect
First Amendment limitations.
In sum, some recent decisions have erred in concluding that inquiry
restrictions, therapy bans, and compelled disclosures are mere regulations of
conduct incident to the practice of a profession. These unprecedented
regulations target or compel communications based on their specific content.
The communications themselves may ultimately turn out to be unprotected
speech. However, to characterize patient inquiries, follow-up questions,
detailed oral and visual scripts, and lengthy exchanges between patients and
their therapists regarding sexual orientation as pure conduct not even covered
by the Free Speech Clause tortures and further confuses an already unstable
and unreliable distinction. States cannot evade scrutiny of professional rights
speech or other professional speech regulations on this basis.
B. Institutionalism and Opportunism
The speech-conduct analysis taps into some broader First Amendment
concerns. In assessing the appropriate scope of governmental power over
professional practices and professional speech, First Amendment
institutionalism and opportunism are both worthy of some consideration. In
its strong form, institutionalism would suggest that First Amendment
coverage ought to be quite broad, perhaps covering any and all professional
257. See discussion infra Sections II1.E-F.
258. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc).
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communications and practices. Opportunism, by contrast, might suggest no
First Amendment coverage at all for professional speech. The examples
discussed in Part I demonstrate that at least in their strongest forms, both of
these approaches are flawed.
First Amendment institutionalists argue that when applying First
Amendment doctrines and principles, courts ought to pay special attention to
the unique characteristics of certain institutions." 9 Some institutions, such as
universities and churches, perform unique functions and play critical roles in
terms of serving First Amendment values. Rather than insisting upon
application of general expressive rules across the entire range of social
interactions, an institutional approach takes these special functions and roles
into account. It provides special protection to worthy First Amendment
institutions, deferring to their judgments and granting them special protection
from governmental regulation.
Under an institutional approach, one might argue that professional
practices, as such, are deserving of special protection from state regulation.
Under this strong version of the institutional approach, the licensed
professions would be considered legally autonomous and self-governing
institutions largely free from state regulation. Following this approach, many
or even most state efforts to regulate professional practices, including the
examples discussed in Part I, would be considered presumptively suspect
under the First Amendment. At the very least, such regulations would raise
serious free speech concerns. Indeed, under a strong institutionalist approach
even generally applicable laws, such as malpractice laws, might be
considered suspect.
The basic institutionalist intuition is correct: professional-client
relationships are social institutions which are grounded in specialized
knowledge, as to which a considerable degree of self-regulation applies. 60
However, for a number of reasons, a strong institutionalist approach would
be problematic insofar as professional speech is concerned. Thus, the
argument that regulations of professional rights speech and other
professional-client communications are suspect under the First Amendment
ought not to rest on institutionalist principles.
In contrast to entities such as universities and churches, which are readily
identifiable, defining the relevant institution insofar as the professions are
concerned is not so simple. It is not clear whether the institutionalist approach
259. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2012); Paul Horwitz,
Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1497 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256 (2005).
260. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 777-78.
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would define the relevant institution as a group of professionals, professional
associations, or the relationship between individual professionals and their
clients or patients. Unlike a church or library, "professional speech" is not, as
such, an "institution." Moreover, even if professional speech generally meets
the basic criteria for institutional consideration,261 not all professions perform
important First Amendment functions. Legal and medical professions can
plausibly be described as engaged in important processes of collecting and
disseminating knowledge and information to the public. However, the same
cannot generally be said of nail technicians, morticians, tour guides, and a
host of other licensed professionals. As a result, in the case of the licensed
professions, the basic rationale for providing special deference and protection
to institutions may not hold up across the range of disciplines.
There are also substantive problems with application of the institutionalist
approach to licensed professionals. As Robert Post has observed, under the
strongest and most literal application of institutionalism, "First Amendment
coverage should be triggered by any political regulation of extant
professional practices. 262 This approach, which Post correctly characterizes
as "implausible," would render not just state inquiry bans and the like but
even professional malpractice regulations subject to First Amendment
review. 263 However, as discussed earlier, professional malpractice rules and
other professional regulations do not generally implicate First Amendment
values.26 In sum, First Amendment institutionalism may sweep too broadly
insofar as it assigns constitutional value to professional practices as such.
Institutionalism could also undermine important individual free speech
values. Insofar as the institutional approach assigns great deference to the
professions themselves to restrict speech, it may negatively affect the free
speech rights of both professionals and their clients. Within the social
institution of the professional-client relationship, individual expressive rights
must also be protected and preserved. Moreover, as discussed below, granting
too much deference to the professions to police their own members' speech
could validate politically motivated professional restrictions.265 Professional
organizations are susceptible to political pressure and, in some cases, capture.
Thus, institutionalism's basic assumption that the professions and other
institutions will generally or always be guided by First Amendment values
and principles seems questionable.
261. See HORWITZ, supra note 259, at 248 (arguing that professional speech "meets the basic
definitional criteria for First Amendment institutions").
262. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 51.
263. Id.
264. See discussion supra Section II1.A.
265. See discussion infra Section III.E.
1340 [Ariz. St. L.J.
PROFESSIONAL RIGHTS SPEECH
Perhaps these and other concerns have led even committed institutionalists
to locate the licensed professions, and professional speech, within the
"borderlands of institutionalism. '"266 As discussed in the next Section,
institutionalists' supposition that as an "institution," professional speech
often "contributes to public discourse" in a way that makes it worthy of First
Amendment consideration, is surely correct. 267 And institutionalists' focus on
social and other contextual factors can flesh out why certain kinds of
restrictions on professional advice are deeply problematic. Thus, the
institutionalist account provides further reason to view at least some
restrictions on professional speech as troubling from a free speech
perspective. However, not all professional advice makes a contribution to
social discourse, and even within the professional-client relationship some
state regulation is justified. Recent professional speech regulations support
Robert Post's assertion that "a more nuanced inquiry is required, one which
will evaluate whether particular government regulations threaten particular
constitutional values. 268
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one might argue that the Free Speech
Clause is simply not an appropriate "fit" for most challenges to professional
regulations-including, or especially, the sorts of professional regulations
discussed in Part I. This argument is based on the concept of free speech
"opportunism," which is associated most prominently with Professor Fred
Schauer.269 Schauer's central observation is that "doctrinally dubious"
arguments against government regulations are sometimes "recast in First
Amendment terms" in order to convince judges that the regulations are
morally or otherwise invalid. 70 According to Schauer, this strategic use of
the Free Speech Clause has occurred in various contexts, including
commercial speech, nude dancing, and campaign finance.27' Schauer
contends that opportunistic or strategic invocation of the First Amendment in
these and other contexts may ultimately transform the free speech guarantee
in unanticipated ways, and could have a negative effect on coverage for things
like core political speech.272
266. See HORWITZ, supra note 259, at 247 (placing professional speech in the "borderlands").
267. Id. at 249.
268. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 52.
269. Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 174-97 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
Professor Schauer has also, incidentally, been influential in the area of First Amendment
institutionalism. See Schauer, supra note 259.
270. Schauer, supra note 269, at 184.
271. Id.
272. See id at 176 (observing that if the choice of free speech claims is based on goals
"external to the First Amendment rather than as a consequence of the purposes the First
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A critique based on "opportunism" would suggest that litigants, courts,
and commentators who claim free speech protection against professional
inquiry bans, therapy bans, and compulsory disclosures might be engaged in
a form of strategic behavior. In effect, they may be substituting a free speech
argument for a more apt or fitting economic liberty argument grounded in the
Due Process Clause. In sum, recognizing, correctly, that due process claims
will have no real purchase in the context of economic regulation, litigants are
turning to the Free Speech Clause as a second-best argument against a new
generation of professional regulations.
Part I is at least a partial response to this concern. It contended that inquiry
bans, therapy bans, and compelled disclosures are regulations of professional
rights speech that affect important First Amendment rights and principles.
Viewed from this perspective, constitutional challenges to these regulations
are not regulatory challenges masquerading as expressive claims. They are
appropriate invocations of the Free Speech Clause, not opportunistic
substitutions.
First Amendment challenges to licensure requirements, certain state-
imposed entry barriers, or even pricing regulations would indeed be second-
best claims worthy of the label "opportunistic." In contrast, inquiry bans,
therapy bans, and compulsory abortion disclosures do not in any way target
the economic dimension of professional-client relationships. Nor do they
challenge the state's basic police power to license professionals, or demand
that they meet rudimentary standards of expertise or care. Instead, First
Amendment challenges to laws like those discussed in Part I aim squarely at
free speech values and concerns. In essence, professionals are claiming First
Amendment coverage for asking questions and engaging in therapeutic
exercises. They are also responding to state compulsion of detailed scripts
and narratives. But for the fact of state licensure, coverage and protection in
these contexts would be presumed. The pertinent question, then, is not why
free speech claims are appropriate in these contexts, but rather why licensure
permits the government to ban and compel in the asserted ways.
Indeed, it is arguably the states, not the plaintiffs, who are acting
opportunistically. States are using their licensure authority to restrict what
would otherwise be clearly covered expression. State defendants have offered
seemingly limitless accounts of their power to regulate licensed
professionals. Relying primarily on Justice White's Lowe concurrence and
the inscrutable Casey paragraph, states have argued that any communications
that occur within the professional-client relationship are conduct, part of a
Amendment was designed to serve, we may as a nation find ourselves with a cultural
understanding of the First Amendment that diverges substantially from what a less misused First
Amendment would have produced").
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course of treatment, or otherwise subject to reasonable regulations. What is
reasonable under this regime is to be defined by the state, pursuant to its
power to license.
This is an extraordinary claim of regulatory power, one that extends far
beyond entrance barriers, knowledge requirements, or ordinary standards of
care. It is essentially an argument that physicians, therapists, lawyers, and
other licensed professionals leave their First Amendment rights outside their
office doors. States are asserting this extraordinary power in the context of
treatments and professional practices that implicate constitutional rights, such
as the right to bear arms and abortion. Perhaps unable or unwilling to regulate
speech on these matters directly, or with respect to the public, states have
turned to their licensure power to express disagreement with professional
speech and to convey particular state viewpoints regarding these matters.
Regulation of professional speech is thus a second-best means for states to
weigh in on disputed constitutional rights.
As the examples discussed in Part I show, states are reshaping the
professional-client relationship in fundamental ways. We ought not to
respond to professional speech regulations by declaring that the professions
are entitled to be free from all state regulations. That takes institutionalism
too far, and may sacrifice important state interests as well as individual free
speech rights. Nor, however, can we simply dismiss professionals' free
speech concerns by pointing to their licensed status. As recent enactments
show, the danger stemming from professional regulations is not that the First
Amendment will be unrecognizable should some professional free speech
claims succeed. Rather, the greater danger is that the professional-client
relationship will be unrecognizable should all such claims fail.
C. Professional Speech and First Amendment Values
Even assuming that inquiry restrictions, therapy bans, and compelled
disclosures regulate speech and not merely conduct and that challenges to
these laws are not examples of opportunism, questions remain regarding both
the value of such communications and the degree of First Amendment
protection to afford them. Judicial analysis has been particularly deficient in
considering this issue. The Supreme Court has not said anything explicit
regarding the First Amendment values associated with professional speech.
In recent cases, lower courts have also failed to address the First Amendment
values associated with professional communications.
As I have argued, courts have failed to consider professional rights speech
concerns, such as those identified in Part II. In particular, courts have failed
to appreciate the connection between professional speech and the world
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beyond professionals' offices. Contrary to judicial suppositions,
professional-client interactions are not insular events shut off from the
concerns of the broader society.
Some commentators have attempted to fill the First Amendment
theoretical gap. 73  Although existing theories and approaches are
underdeveloped in certain respects, they demonstrate that courts have
generally ignored the connection between professional communications and
free speech values.
Free speech scholars have elaborated on the speech rights of clients and
professionals and, perhaps most importantly, generated important insights
into the public-private distinction some courts have relied on to uphold
professional speech regulations. As commentators have noted, professionals
advising their clients are not similarly situated to street corner orators and
other speakers present in the public sphere.27 4 Thus, the state can regulate
professional speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to
ordinary public speech. Again, malpractice laws, which indirectly regulate
some speech content, are paradigmatic examples. These laws are designed to
preserve and protect the professional-client relationship, including important
aspects and characteristics such as trust, professional expertise, and
confidence.275
Professional-client interactions occur within what Professor Halberstam
has referred to as "bounded speech institutions. 276 Within these socially
defined relationships, the state may intervene in ways that are necessary to
preserve the institution.277 Client protection and preservation of professional
standards are undoubtedly important state interests. However, these interests
do not extinguish the First Amendment rights of clients or the professionals
they consult. 78 Commentators have argued that professional speech
273. See sources cited supra note 3.
274. See, e.g., POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 18-23 (discussing the application of
the First Amendment in public and private spheres); Halberstam, supra note 3, at 773, 777
(explaining the difference between regulation of public speech by street comer orator and
regulation of speech by professionals).
275. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 45 ("[L]aw stands as a surety for the
disciplinary truth of expert pronouncements."); Halberstam, supra note 3, at 773 (explaining that
regulation of professionals "maintain[s] the profession" by insisting on adherence to professional
standards).
276. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 778.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 846 (contending that professional speech merits some free speech protection);
see also POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 47 ("First Amendment coverage might arise in
contexts that are distinct from malpractice, in which the state may seek to corrupt, rather than to
protect, the diffusion of expert knowledge."); Haupt, supra note 3, at 5 (professionals have First
Amendment right "to express one's professional opinion as a member of the knowledge
community").
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regulations generally implicate the free speech rights of both clients and
professionals, and that coverage and protection for professional speech is
justified under some or all of the principal First Amendment theories-
autonomy, self-government, and the search for truth.27 9
Commentators, and a few courts, have expressly acknowledged the
important autonomy interests that can be affected by professional speech
regulations.28° Professionals have a First Amendment interest in conveying
relevant information to their clients, and clients in turn have a First
Amendment interest in receiving this information. Nonetheless, most courts
reviewing recent regulations have not considered these personal liberty or
autonomy interests to be weighty enough to merit full First Amendment
coverage or protection.
In particular, courts have placed significant emphasis on the "private"
nature of professional-client communications and consultations .2 1 As a
result, they have attached little or no public value to speech that occurs in a
physician's office during a one-on-one consultation. However, as Professor
Halberstam observes, "professionals provide individuals with access to
information that enables the latter to come to important decisions affecting
their lives. '282 Further, as discussed in Part II, professionals such as attorneys
"take an active part in assisting in the vindication of existing legal and
constitutional rights in courts and other government fora. ' 283
279. See, e.g., POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 33-34 (resting basis for protection for
professional speech on the principle of "democratic competence," which focuses on the
dissemination and receipt of knowledge relevant to public discourse); Halberstam, supra note 3,
at 815 (observing that professional speech "serves to educate the citizenry, is integral to the
workings of self-government, and may even itself form part of a lesson in democracy" and that
liberty theories offer no justification for excluding professional speech from coverage); Haupt,
supra note 3, at 28-35 (arguing that professional speech protection is justified under autonomy,
marketplace, and self-government approaches).
280. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasizing the
"informational function" of professional speech and drawing an analogy to protection for
commercial speech); Berg, supra note 3, at 234 (rooting theory of protection for doctor-patient
discourse in autonomy interests of patients); Haupt, supra note 3, at 29-32 (discussing the
"decisional autonomy interests" of clients and the "professional autonomy interests" of physicians
and other professionals).
281. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger I11), No. 12-14009, 2015
WL 8639875, at *20 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (explaining that when physicians meet with
patients in examination rooms and discuss, treatment, the conversation "is easily classified as
professional speech"); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1218
(11 th Cir. 2014) (contending that a professional's speech rights "approach a nadir.., when the
professional speaks privately, in the course of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a
person receiving the professional's services").
282. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 812.
283. Id.; see also discussion, supra Section ll.B.
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Indeed, even intimate, personal treatment advice from professionals can
relate to significant public concerns. Professor Halberstam argues that the
fact that professionals generally address the personal concerns of clients
"does not rule out the possibility that individuals take political action based
on the knowledge gained from consulting with a professional about an issue
that was initially of a particularly personal concern." '284 Thus, he concludes,
professional speech "would appear to fall within the expanded political
speech principle." '285 According to Halberstam: "[P]rofessional speech serves
to educate the citizenry, is integral to the workings of self-government, and
may even itself form part of a lesson in democracy." '286 These observations
support the argument that professional rights speech regulations threaten
significant free speech values. Beyond that, they raise questions about the
proposition that what takes place in examining rooms and therapists' offices
is a private dialogue that has no effect on public discourse.
Robert Post contends that protection for professional speech depends upon
its relationship to self-government and public discourse. 87 Post argues that a
professional's interest in autonomy will not shield her from liability for
malpractice or other breaches of professional standards. Only insofar as the
professional's speech relates to public matters and is important to discussion
of those matters does First Amendment coverage "materialize. 288 Under
Post's approach, First Amendment coverage "should extend to all efforts
deemed normatively necessary for influencing public opinion. '2 9 As he
notes, public opinion is generally formed in the public sphere.290 In that
sphere, individual speakers and their audiences are presumed to be
autonomous and equal. In the private sphere, by contrast, the state may
sometimes treat audiences as "dependent, vulnerable, and hence unequal."2 9
Thus, owing to asymmetries of information and power in the professional-
client relationship, malpractice law can regulate the content of a
professional's speech in a manner that would be impermissible in the public
sphere.2 92
Nevertheless, Post argues that shielding some professional-client
interactions from state regulation and interference is critical to the formation
284. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 813.
285. Id. at 812.
286. Id. at 815.
287. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 13.
288. Id. at 12.
289. Id. at 18.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 23.
292. Id.
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of public opinion and public decision-making. 93 His approach does not locate
coverage and protection for professional speech in the concept of the
marketplace of ideas. Post contends that scientific and other technical
expertise are not products of "the indiscriminate engagement of all."294 Thus,
the government can impose standards to ensure the reliability of expert
knowledge. However, as Post puts it, "[a] state that controls our knowledge
controls our minds. '295 Thus, he proposes a constitutional principle of
"democratic competence," which "refers to the cognitive empowerment of
persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their access to
disciplinary knowledge. 296 Cognitive empowerment, he writes, "is necessary
both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic
legitimation. "297
Although public opinion is generally formed in the public sphere, Post
argues that "there is no reason why public opinion might not be formed one
conversation at a time."2 9 He offers as an example a dental patient who, upon
hearing from his dentist that amalgams are dangerous, wants to advocate in
favor of legislation banning the devices.299 Post observes: "So long as
knowledge is potentially relevant to the formation of public opinion, I do not
see in principle why it should constitutionally matter whether it is distributed
to one person or to a thousand."300
Under the democratic competence approach, expert knowledge
communicated in the private setting of a physician's or lawyer's office would
sometimes be covered by the First Amendment. According to Post,
malpractice and other general standard of care regulations do not generally
interfere with the formation and exercise of democratic competence. 0
However, "legislation which prohibits expert professionals from
communicating knowledge to their clients, or, conversely, legislation which
compels professionals to communicate false information to their clients,"
undermines democratic competence.30 2 Such laws "compromise the
293. Id. at 41.
294. Id. at 29.
295. Id. at 33.
296. Id. at 33-34.
297. Id. at 34.
298. Id. at 46.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id. at 45-46 (observing that malpractice law "endows [professional]
communications" with the status of knowledge and protects vulnerable clients).
302. Id. at 47-48.
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constitutional value of democratic competence" by interfering with the
dissemination of expert knowledge.3 °3
In a recent analysis of professional speech, Claudia Haupt similarly
concludes that professional-client communications are deserving of at least
some First Amendment protection.3 °4 Haupt argues that professional speech
merits protection under autonomy, marketplace, and self-government
theories.3 5 Although she agrees with Post and others that traditional
marketplace principles do not apply in the context of professional speech,
Haupt argues that the First Amendment covers and protects a marketplace
defined by the relevant "knowledge community. ' 30 6 Thus, government can
regulate for the purpose of "preserving the integrity of the search for truth-
that is, the formation of professional knowledge-within the discourse of the
knowledge community. ' 30 7 However, regulations that threaten to destroy or
negatively affect the integrity of the search for truth are suspect.
Like Post, Haupt also contends that professionals generally contribute to
the knowledge base of information that is used by citizens to make informed
decisions, both within the boundaries of the professional relationship and
beyond it.30 8 She is skeptical that a client is typically thinking about the
"policy implications of the professional advice she receives. "309 However,
Haupt concludes that "the abstract possibility of taking political action based
on the individualized professional advice received appears to be enough to
justify applying [self-government] theory to professional speech."310
As the discussion here and in Part II shows, there is a considerable
disconnect between the academic commentaries on the free speech values of
professional speech and many recent professional speech precedents. Unlike
courts, most commentators have recognized the public and collective values
inherent in professional-client interactions. They have observed the manner
in which these interactions connect with, affect, and facilitate self-
governance and, to a lesser extent, the search for truth. Also in stark contrast
to recent court decisions, commentators have looked beyond the "private"
professional-client relationship and have identified constructs-bounded
speech institutions, democratic competence, knowledge communities-that
303. Id. at 53.
304. Haupt, supra note 3, at 59.
305. Id at 28.
306. Id. at 32; see also Kry, supra note 3, at 960 (concluding that professional speech, even
when personalized in the professional-client setting, "is no more or less valuable than impersonal
speech in helping recipients ascertain the truth").
307. Haupt, supra note 3, at 34.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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permit government to regulate, but that also apply some free speech limits.
In sum, scholars have generally rejected the rigid private-public distinction
some courts have relied on to characterize professional-client interactions as
private conduct undeserving of First Amendment consideration.
Of course, First Amendment coverage does not automatically or
necessarily entail First Amendment protection. Commentators also recognize
the government's important interests in maintaining professional standards
and protecting clients. However, some argue that the free speech values
associated with professional-client interactions support applying a form of
heightened scrutiny to at least some professional speech regulations. Thus,
Halberstam and Post both suggest that professional speech merits protection
roughly analogous to that provided for commercial speech.31' Haupt would
peg protection for professional speech to the state of the art in the relevant
"knowledge community." '312 Under her approach, any professional speech
that does not follow the discipline's standard of care, as determined by the
expert community, would not be entitled to free speech protection."'
However, speech that falls within the standard of care would merit at least
some First Amendment protection.
These justifications and observations support application of heightened
scrutiny to at least some professional speech regulations. In particular, they
support meaningful scrutiny of professional rights speech regulations. For
example, Florida's Firearm Owners Privacy Protection Act, which restricts
physician inquiries that the relevant expert community believes to be relevant
to patient care, implicates the free speech rights of both patients and
professionals. Further, the Florida law prohibits conversations about gun
ownership and health care, both of which are clearly matters of public
concern-even when they are discussed in the "private" confines of a
professional's office. The Florida law does not seek to preserve the bounded
speech institution or professional relationship, but to suppress inquiries and
"remodel the institution to [the state's] liking."'3 14 The Florida law also
interferes with the dissemination of expert advice and the development of
what Post calls "democratic competence," by undermining "social practices
that produce and distribute disciplinary knowledge."3 ' In other words, it
seeks "to corrupt, rather than to protect, the diffusion of expert knowledge." '3 1 6
311. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 43; see also Halberstam, supra note 3, at
838 (contending that professional speech should receive "no less protection than commercial
speech").
312. Haupt, supra note 3, at 9.
313. Id. at44.
314. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 862.
315. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 33.
316. Id. at47.
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Finally, as Haupt observes, laws like Florida's corrupt the insights of the
knowledge community rather than defer to them.317
Under current theories and approaches, laws banning SOCE and perhaps
other talk therapies present closer and more complex free speech issues.
Although the empirical evidence relating to the harms associated with talk
versions of reparative therapy is not fully developed, the professional
(knowledge) community's experts generally support state bans as to minors.
That may be sufficient under Haupt's approach, which advocates deference
to the "knowledge community" regarding the identifiable state of the art.3 18
Halberstam's "bounded institution" approach might also allow for SOCE
bans on the ground that they are necessary to preserve the social and legal
relationship between professional and client.319 Finally, although Dean Post's
"democratic competence" theory suggests that laws which prohibit experts
from communicating knowledge to their clients may violate the First
Amendment, he also suggests that courts must take relevant expert
knowledge into account and apply the disciplinary standards and methods of
the expert community.3 20 Post also acknowledges that "[p]olitical correction
may at times be necessary to overcome the temptation of professional experts
to engage in forms [sic] self-aggrandizement that harm the public.""32
As discussed more fully in Part II, perhaps the most compelling case for
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny of SOCE bans does not relate to the
therapy's positive free speech values, but rather the negative justification that
government is not permitted to restrict speech based on its disagreement with
the message it represents.322 Commentators have failed to contextualize the
SOCE bans as relating to an important matter of public concern-the nature
of sexual orientation and its relationship to gay equality. Insofar as the
therapy causes harm, the bans may well be justified. However, the free speech
concern cannot be resolved solely by referring to the experts' or knowledge
communities' state of the art. Here, and in other examples, states are
regulating more than ordinary professional-client interactions.
Under existing scholarly approaches, some compulsory abortion
disclosure laws would also be vulnerable to First Amendment challenge.
Some of these laws, in particular those that require the disclosure of
317. See Haupt, supra note 3, at 57-58 (arguing that Florida's restrictions on gun ownership
inquiries violates the professional speech rights of physicians and patients).
318. See id. at 48-51 (suggesting that courts defer to expert community regarding SOCE, but
acknowledging fact-finding difficulties will likely arise).
319. See Halberstam, supra note 3, at 857, 866-67 (suggesting that states may regulate
medical advice regarding marijuana use).
320. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 47, 55-58.
321. Id. at 97.
322. See supra Section II.D.
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untruthful or ideological statements and that do not adequately preserve the
medical expert's opportunity to disagree or disassociate, would undermine
rather than preserve the physician-client relationship. 323 Robert Post singles
out laws that compel the dissemination of untruthful or misleading
information about abortion, arguing that they undermine democratic
competence.3 24 Similarly, Haupt concludes that compelled abortion
disclosures are the "most problematic" examples of professional speech
regulation and the "most likely impermissible. 3 25 These regulations are
sometimes "incompatible with the knowledge community's insights, or
prohibit[] the professional from communicating the knowledge community's
insights. 326
Some of these arguments might be gaining a modicum of traction in the
courts. For instance, the Fourth Circuit, in a decision that parts company with
sister circuits, recently invalidated an abortion disclosure law under a
heightened scrutiny standard.3 27 Were courts more generally to recognize the
free speech values associated with professional-client interactions, other new
and even next-generation regulations might also come under serious First
Amendment scrutiny.
In sum, existing academic literature provides support for reviewing at least
some professional speech regulations under a heightened scrutiny standard.
The fact that the speech occurs within the boundaries of a licensed
professional-client relationship does not license the state to suppress, restrict,
and compel whatever content it wishes. Commentators have provided a
useful foundation for skeptical judicial review of professional speech
regulations, including those that target professional rights speech. As I argue
in the next two sections, however, there are additional reasons, separate and
apart from preserving speech institutions, facilitating democratic
competence, and respecting knowledge communities, for instituting rigorous
review of professional speech regulations.
D. Professional Independence and Judgment
In defending recent professional speech regulations, states have
emphasized the vulnerability of clients and the need to preserve the trust and
323. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014) (criticizing North
Carolina abortion disclosure law for undermining professional judgment).
324. See POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 47-48; see also Post, Informed Consent,
supra note 3, at 978-79 (discussing abortion informed consent laws).
325. Haupt, supra note 3, at 53-54.
326. Id. at 53.
327. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 249.
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confidence necessary for effective professional-client relationships.3 28 Courts
and commentators have also acknowledged and emphasized asymmetries of
information and power within professional relationships, and the
government's need to regulate in response to these concerns.3 29 However, for
the most part, neither courts nor theorists have paid adequate attention to the
need to preserve professional independence and judgment.
As a general matter, client trust and confidence are serious and weighty
concerns the state may act to preserve. However, as recent regulations show,
these regulatory justifications may not be as strong as first appears, in part
because they are incomplete. One significant problem is that prohibiting
specific professional inquiries and providing detailed scripts to professionals
can undermine the very trust and confidence states purport to be protecting.
States are rightly concerned about the asymmetries of power and
information that inhere in professional-client relationships. Malpractice and
informed consent laws seek to account for such concerns. However, these and
other regulations assume some degree of expert independence from the state
and other third parties. Unlike some recent regulations, professional care
standards do not typically proscribe or prescribe, in advance of treatment, a
set of specific statements, lines of inquiry, courses of care, etc. A trier of fact
may ultimately determine that the professional's exercise of independent
judgment has failed to meet the expert community's standards. However, that
determination follows the exercise of a professional's independent
judgment.33 °
Concerns regarding professional independence do not prohibit regulators
from banning dangerous treatments or procedures ex ante. Where expert
evidence demonstrates a clear and specific harm, states may act to prevent it.
Moreover, if a practice is proven to be harmful or fraudulent, states can
enforce generally applicable health and consumer fraud laws. However,
special concerns arise where regulations target professionals' advice to
clients or expert methods that rely solely or substantially on things like oral
communications.
Client trust and confidence is reposed in professionals in part owing to the
presumption that their advice is based on independent assessments and
judgments. Given their character and specificity, recent regulations create
328. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 11I), No. 12-14009, 2015
WL 8639875, at *28 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) ("A patient is in a relationship of trust and
confidence with a doctor and looks to the doctor's informed opinion for guidance.").
329. See id. (noting the "significant power imbalance" between physician and patient); see
also Halberstam, supra note 3, at 845 (noting the "imbalance of authority" in professional-client
relationships).
330. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (AM. BAR ASs'N 1980)
(requiring that lawyers exercise independent judgment).
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serious doubt regarding the degree of experts' independence from the state.
This raises risks that are related to, but distinct from, issues of professional
or client autonomy. 3 In a variety of contexts, clients may begin to wonder
whether the questions they are being asked (or not asked), the oral persuasion
they may encounter, or the disclosures they are receiving are the product of
external forces or independent expert judgment. Professional speech
regulations might allow the state to "remodel the institution to its liking" by
removing or seriously undermining professionals' independence.
32
Professional speech regulations, including those that target rights speech,
could undermine the very trust and confidence the state purports to be
preserving. This could alter the fundamental nature of the professional-client
relationship itself
Licensed professionals obviously do not operate entirely independent of
the state. Indeed, as noted, governments can insist on compliance with
professional standards of care, ethical codes, and the like. However, client
trust and confidence are based at least in part on the state's understanding of
and respect for the professional state of the art. The need for professional
independence is perhaps greater for certain professions. As Kathleen Sullivan
has observed, lawyers cannot be treated entirely as agents of the state, "for
part of their very job description within the administration of justice is to
challenge the state." '333 However, regardless of profession, any expert treated
as an "agent of the state" cannot be said to exercise independent professional
judgment. Professionals employed by the state can certainly be designated as
such, and their advice communicated and received as expressly state-
sanctioned. However, professionals who are not employed by the state cannot
be subject to its complete control and must be permitted to exercise
independent judgment on behalf of their clients.334
States may argue that they are merely defining professional standards of
care in very specific terms. However, for example, the substance of Florida's
Firearms Privacy Protection Act is actually contrary to the professional
community's expert understandings, insights, and practices.335 Similarly,
331. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 3, at 1334-38 (discussing physician and patient autonomy
concerns as they relate to compulsory abortion disclosures).
332. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 862. Cf Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
544 (2001) ("Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments and
analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys").
333. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 588.
334. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 3, at 849 ("[A] federally funded physician cannot be
given a script, although a federally funded family planning official can.").
335. See Haupt, supra note 3, at 58 (contending that restrictions on firearms ownership
violate the free speech rights of physicians and patients because they prohibit inquires that are
considered relevant to the "knowledge community").
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some compelled abortion disclosures are incompatible with expert
knowledge and opinion, or seek to compel blatantly ideological statements.336
These and similar regulations can distort the physician-patient relationship
in harmful ways. For example, they may create serious doubt regarding
whose opinion is being communicated, and thus about whether the facts and
opinions patients are receiving from chosen professionals originate with the
expert or someone else.3 7 Even when the professional is permitted to
disclaim the state's ideology or its specific statements, the client may already
have ceased listening, or may be confused as to why the professional must
disclaim information that is simultaneously being provided.
As in other respects, SOCE bans present a more complicated example but
ultimately raise similar concerns. The bans are based at least in part on an ex
ante determination of harm, a finding that trumps any interest in professional
independence. Further, SOCE prohibitions permit therapists to discuss the
therapy with patients, and even to recommend the therapy be obtained
through an unlicensed professional. Presumably, therapists can also explain
why they are not permitted to perform the therapy on consenting patients.
Still, this kind of law distorts conversations between professionals and
clients in unusual ways and may even distort the professional-client
institution itself.33 Clients may be told that despite the therapist's
independent assessment of the harms and benefits of the proscribed therapy,
the state has banned its use. However, the same therapist can provide a
-referral to an unlicensed therapist, who may then legally perform the banned
therapy. If the state may dictate the state of professional knowledge and
judgment in this fashion, at the very least clients may be confused or, more
seriously, they may begin to more generally question the value of the licensed
professional's expertise. Again, this does not necessarily mean that SOCE
bans violate the Free Speech Clause. However, courts ought to proceed
carefully in light of the independence and distortive harms that may be
associated with these and similar proscriptions.
States have also pointed to the need to protect vulnerable clients from
professional overreaching, harassment, and other harmful behavior. Fully
independent professionals may go rogue, they suggest, in effect disregarding
336. See id at 53 (characterizing compelled physician disclosures as the "most problematic"
example of professional speech regulation); Post, Informed Consent, supra note 3, at 978-79
(contending that some compulsory abortion disclosures violate the First Amendment).
337. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 1326-34 (discussing the "distortion" harms associated with
some mandatory abortion disclosures).
338. Cf Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (invalidating spending
conditions relating to lawyers' expression in part because "the Government seeks to use an
existing medium of expression and to control it, in a class of cases, in ways which distort its usual
functioning").
[Ariz. St. L.J.1354
PROFESSIONAL RIGHTS SPEECH
their clients' interests and pursuing their own. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit emphasized Florida's concerns regarding the vulnerability of adult
patients presenting for annual checkups.33 9 The court expressed particular
concerns regarding patients in rural areas, who may only have access to a
single physician.34°
Courts should view these sorts of justifications with some skepticism.
Moreover, they should demand some degree of consistency. If client
vulnerability constitutes a real and substantial concern in the context of
detailed professional speech regulations, states would presumably account
for it in all contexts. However, states have generally shown little or no
concern regarding the vulnerability of women-including those in rural
areas-who present at health clinics for the purpose of procuring an
abortion.34 In fact, the uniqueness of the abortion procedure is most often
cited as a reason why women must be provided with ever-more-detailed
information about the procedure. With regard to the SOCE bans, minors are
surely among the most vulnerable patient populations. However, if SOCE is
as harmful as some states contend, the harmful effects and potentially
insidious power dynamic would seem to be present in adult-professional
interactions as well. Yet to date, no state has banned SOCE as to adult
patients.
Focusing on recent professional speech regulations helps to highlight
often-ignored concerns regarding professional independence and distortion
of the professional-client relationship. These concerns relate not solely to
specific communications, but rather to the nature of professional-client
relationships. Recent and perhaps next-generation professional speech
regulations may undermine rather than preserve clients' trust and confidence
in professional judgment. Treating licensed professionals as agents of the
state will undermine broad free speech values relating to the independent
gathering and dissemination of expert knowledge and the free flow of
information, which are critically important well beyond the confines of
professional offices.
339. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger II1), No. 12-14009, 2015 WL
8639875, at *28 (11 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (discussing the power imbalance and access to care
concerns inherent in physician-patient interactions regarding firearms).
340. Id.
341. The Fourth Circuit's recent Camnitz decision is a notable exception. See Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing the special vulnerabilities of women
during abortion-related examinations).
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E. Politics and Professionalism
Robert Post has argued that extending protection to some professional
speech "immunizes such practices and methods from unrestricted political
manipulation. 3 42 Recent enactments and judicial decisions demonstrate just
how vulnerable professionals remain to different kinds of political
manipulation, and how important it is to provide free speech protection to
some of their communications. This includes, but is not limited to,
communications relating to constitutional rights.
Some recent professional speech regulations appear to be rooted in
political rather than medical, therapeutic, or other legitimate disciplinary
considerations. Florida's restrictions on firearms inquiries and "harassment"
were enacted in part owing to complaints-some made by National Rifle
Association representatives-that doctors were questioning patients'
ownership of firearms on safety grounds.3 43 Contrary to the judgment of
medical professionals and their leading organizations, the Florida legislature
chose to restrict firearms inquiries in order to combat a supposed political
agenda against firearms. Moreover, the seemingly selective concerns
regarding patient trust and confidence discussed earlier suggest that laws like
Florida's are rooted in concerns other than, or at least in addition to, the
preservation of professional-client relationships. Ultimately, the physician-
patient relationship was altered and distorted so that the state could defend
purportedly vulnerable gun owners from questions about firearms safety.
Compulsory abortion disclosures are often similarly connected to the
politics of abortion.34 4 States that mandate ideological disclosures are
pursuing something other than, or again in addition to, informed consent
protections. Indeed, some of the laws are appropriately viewed as official
statements that abortion is discouraged as a matter of state policy. Particularly
insofar as they do not permit physicians to disclaim or disassociate from the
state's policy, compulsory disclosures smuggle politics into examining rooms
under the pretext of providing expert advice. Again, when this occurs, law
does not "stand[] as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert
pronouncements." '345 Instead, law becomes a means of importing abortion
politics into medical decision-making. Physicians become not just agents of
the state, but in some instances a kind of political operative-though one that
is not on the states' official payroll.
342. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 59.
343. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1232-33 (11 th
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recounting legislative history).
344. See Zick, supra note 1, at 39 (noting the political context in which abortion speech
regulations have been enacted).
345. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 45.
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As discussed, SOCE bans are based in part on concerns about the physical
and mental well-being of minors. However, that does not mean the laws are
entirely devoid of political motivations or implications. The bans explicitly
reject not merely a course of treatment, but with it a political argument that
was once commonly used to denigrate gays and deny their equality-namely,
that homosexuality is a sickness or disease.3 46 This medical argument has
generally been discredited, and the scientific narrative is no longer a
prominent part of debates concerning gay equality. However, the reparative
therapy movement continues to insist that gay people can change their sexual
orientation with professional assistance.3 47 Just as Florida disagreed with the
alleged anti-firearms perspective said to have been communicated in some
examining rooms, California and New Jersey's legislatures have banned a
therapy with significant political implications and undertones.
The politicization of professional speech undermines not just individual
client trust and confidence, but to some extent the very notion of
professionalism itself. Again, in the context of professional-client
relationships, "law stands as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert
pronouncements. 3 4  This "suretyship" helps to separate professional
interactions from ordinary politics. However, when the state politicizes the
professions, law becomes a means to political rather than disciplinary
(expert) ends.
To be sure, most professional regulations do not raise such concerns. Most
of what the state requires or prohibits in terms of professional conduct may
have little, if any, political valence. However, recent professional rights
speech regulations demonstrate how professional and political influences can
intersect in dangerous ways. This raises the question whether, under its
authority to regulate licensed professionals, the state may restrict or even
prohibit expert activities for solely political reasons. If the First Amendment
simply does not apply within the professional-patient relationship, then one
would assume the state is at liberty to do so. This indeed is the impression
conveyed by some recent professional speech decisions.
Should this impression ripen into actual doctrine, there would seem to be
no reason why governments would be unable to simply ban professionals
from discussing health care policy and other matters of public concern with
their patients. States would be empowered to restrict communications and
conversations that touch upon political subjects that the state itself does not
346. See Eskridge, supra note 233, at 1331 (noting that antigay discourse has changed over
the decades, "with social republican arguments superseding medical arguments, which earlier had
superseded natural law arguments").
347. See id. at 1367 (discussing reparative therapy movement).
348. POST, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 45.
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consider relevant, or appropriate, in the context of professional
consultations.3 49 Governments would be able to merge politics and
professionalism in a manner that makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish
the two.
Thus far, the focus has been on the possibility that governments will
politicize the professions by using them to communicate state policies.
Professional organizations may also be complicit in the politicization of the
professions. Professional organizations are often powerful lobbyists.
Although their expert judgments are entitled to deference, professionals may
seek to import their own political judgments into professional speech
regulations.350 Thus, courts must be aware that professional speech
regulations might be infected with both official and organizational political
biases.
Manipulation of professional-client communications for political
purposes, whatever their origins, undermines not just individual client trust
and confidence but more generally public trust and confidence in expert
judgments and professional advice. In this respect, recent professional rights
speech regulations may contribute to a growing general public cynicism
regarding professional expertise. Clients and the public will repose far less
trust in the professions as expositors of expert judgment. Even if
professionals are not viewed as agents of the state, they will lack the
separation and independence necessary to earn public trust. Regulating
professional speech may become a means to a political ends-simply another
pathway for states or third parties to impose political judgments on regulated
individuals, institutions, and those that consult them for advice. In this way,
the "bounded institutions" and "knowledge communities" of the learned
professions may become just another part of the political landscape.
When they review speech regulations, courts do not typically take such
considerations directly into account. However, going forward, they ought to
influence, to at least some degree, how judges approach professional
speech-particularly professional rights speech-regulations. Like concerns
relating to professional judgment and distortion of professional-client
interactions, the prospect of state political manipulation of the licensed
professions is cause for skepticism-particularly insofar as broad state claims
349. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschaleger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1238 (11 th
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("Nor would First Amendment scrutiny apply to an act barring
doctors from talking to their patients about the Affordable Care Act, Medicare or Medicaid,
medical malpractice laws, or any other topic whatsoever.").
350. See Kry, supra note 3, at 972-73 (observing that professions are not just governed by
law but actively seek to influence what the law is, and may have a bias toward weak free speech
rights of members).
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to license professional communications are concerned. Recent examples
indicate that states are becoming increasingly aggressive in their approach to
professional-client interactions. In order to ensure that free speech values and
professional institutions are preserved, courts must engage in rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny of professional rights speech regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
More often than is commonly appreciated, professionals engage with their
clients on matters relating to constitutional rights. Lawyers, physicians, and
other professionals provide information and advice to clients that directly or
indirectly concern the recognition, exercise, or scope of constitutional rights.
Many professionals play unique and important roles in terms of the
facilitation, mediation, and exercise of constitutional rights. State and federal
regulations of what this Article refers to as professional rights speech
implicate a range of constitutional rights, including the right to bear arms,
abortion, contraception, due process, and equality. Future enactments could
affect communications regarding personal choices with regard to family
relationships, gender identity, and the circumstances of one's own death.
The Article has used recently enacted professional regulations to
demonstrate the expressive and non-expressive harms that can occur when
governments suppress, restrict, or compel professional rights speech.
Regulations of professional rights speech are, and ought generally to be
treated as, regulations of political expression based on content. As such, they
raise important free speech concerns and merit strict judicial scrutiny. The
fact that the speakers are licensed professionals, and their audiences are
clients or patients, does not eliminate the need to guard against state
suppression or compulsion of speech-particularly, although not exclusively,
when the speech concerns or relates to constitutional rights.
Strict First Amendment scrutiny is an appropriate response to the
increasingly detailed regulation of professional-client interactions that touch
on or concern constitutional rights. Judicial review of rights speech
regulations would not threaten or eliminate state power to license
professionals, or to insist on their compliance with general standards of
professional care. However, it would protect against resort to professional
regulation to suppress viewpoints contrary to those held by the state, or to
compel private individuals to communicate ideological messages on the
government's behalf. Contrary to some recent lower court rulings,
regulations of professional-client interactions are not merely part of a course
of treatment or professional conduct. Nor, as professional rights speech
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regulations show, are all such conversations merely private discourse having
nothing to do with matters of public concern.
Governmental regulation of professional-client conversations cuts far
closer to core First Amendment concerns than courts have so far been willing
to acknowledge. Challengers are not merely engaging in opportunistic
invocations of free speech rights. Professional rights speech regulations
implicate basic First Amendment values, non-expressive constitutional
rights, the scope of professional independence and judgment, and even the
nature of professionalism itself.
The precise boundaries of free speech protection must be worked out in
individual cases. However, future analysis and commentary should consider
the constitutional and policy implications of increasingly detailed and
politicized governmental regulations of professional rights speech.
